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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to collate the
arguments both for and against increased Canadian involvement
in Latin America with special reference to the question of
Canadian participation in the Organization of American States.
In addition to presenting the historic arguments,
an attempt is made to anticipate Canadian foreign policy in
the near future with a view to fitting Latin America into
the projection of Ottawa's external relations.
studies are discussed

Two case

(Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the

Dominican crisis of 1965) to illustrate the probable effects
of Canadian membership in the Organization of American States.
The first chapter deals with the structure and
function of the Organization in an attempt to clarify the
degree of success it has attained.

Throughout the thesis the

dominant United States presence in Latin America is given
every consideration.
In discussing Canadian involvement in Latin America
every effort is made to consider objectively all the arguments.
Unfortunately, the scope of the topic prohibits detailed
scrutiny in all areas and to some degree objectivity has
perhaps been sacrificed in the author's selection of topics.
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IN T R O D U C T IO N

Canada has undertaken a valuable and effective
role in international affairs especially since 1945.

As

a middle power of considerable stature she has participated
in several regional and universal organizations to her own
benefit and that of her allies and friends.

Canada is a

member of the North American Air Defence Command
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nations

(NORAD),

(N.A.T.O.) and the United

(U.N.), as well as a participant in numerous trade

and aid agencies including the Geneva Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs

(G.A.T.T.) and the Colombo Plan.

Since 1956, the

role of peace-keeping has become a vital aspect of Canadian
foreign policy and negotiated peace settlement the goal of
her international involvement.

Canada's own domestic

interests, in turn, have been geared to the prospects of the
increasing wealth, population and interdependence in the
world.

Economically, Canadians look to their neighbours for

capital investment and export markets.

Since her own

survival depends on trade,'*' Canada naturally is concerned with
1 J.L. Skeggs, External Trade Division, Dominion
Bureau of Statistics (Ottawa, 196 8) notes that twenty percent
of Canada's Gross National Product is directly dependent on
foreign trade - the highest in the world.
I
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increasing the stability, cooperation and viability of
the world around her.

Despite her already intensive

involvement in many areas of the world, Canada remains
separated from one of the oldest existing international
association of nations.
First conceived in the latter part
2
of the 19th century,
the inter-American system did not
assume its present form until after World War II under the
Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogota.

Canada is the single

major Western Hemispheric nation that remains outside the
Organization despite one hundred years of economic interaction
with Latin America.
Based on statements by successive Government
Ministers, it appears somewhat unlikely Canada will join in
the near future regardless of her changing position in the
world of nations.

To illustrate, on March 30, 1939 Prime

Minister Mackenzie King told the House of Commons that
"public opinion in favour of the Pan American Union had not
yet become sufficiently informed or sufficiently widespread
3
and matured to warrant immediate steps to join."
Twenty-two
years later, in 1961, Howard Green, Secretary of State for
External Affairs, stated that Canada was still waiting for
an indicator from the majority of Canadians that such a step
should be taken.

Again, in 1968 Canada's Prime Minister is

2 A. Alvarez, "Latin America and International Law,"
American Journal of International L a w , 1909 p. 276 as cited
in A.V. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, The Organization of American
States (Dallas, 1963), p. 4.
3 John B. Harbron, Canada and the Organization of
American States (Montreal, P.Q., 1963), p. 2.
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still waiting for this onslaught of public opinion to guide
her entry into the Organization of American States

(O.A.S.)

4

In addition, there is evidence to support the view that
Canadian leaders are unsure of the political consequences at
home.

Howard Green, Sidney Smith, John Diefenbaker, Lester

Pearson, Paul Martin, Mitchell Sharp and Pierre Trudeau have
all stated at one time or another that they favour joining
the O.A.S.

5

However, all have been strangely quiet on this

point after they attain a position in the Government.

It

seems that membership in the Government delineates membership
in the O.A.S. to a considerable degree.

Whatever the reasons,

the fact is evident that neither the government nor the
people are anxious to commit the country to a greater role
in Latin America if membership in the O.A.S. is a prerequisite.
This paper will discuss the relationship between
Canada and Latin America with attention to the hegemony of
the United States in the area and an analysis of the O . A . S . ;
The paper explores the conditions for Canadian membership in
the O.A.S., with reference to the structure, functions and
accomplishments of the Organization.

Two case studies on

4 Statement by Pierre Trudeau at Liberal Party
Workshop (Toronto, 1968), p.l.
5 Canada, House of Commons, Debates. July 15, 196 0
p. 6375, Statement by Hon. Howard Green. Ibid., April 26, 1961
p.4032, Statement by Hon. Paul Martin. Ibid., April 17, 1961
p.4085, Statement by Right Hon. L.B. Pearson, Globe and Mail
(October 4, 1965), p.l, Statement by Right Hon. John Diefenbaker,
Liberal Party Workshop Transcript, 1968, Statement by
Right Hon. P.E. Trudeau.
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the Dominican Republic

(1965) and Cuba

(1962) will be

analyzed to demonstrate the responsibilities and restrictions
of membership in the O.A.S.
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CHAPTER I

'THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

The present Organization of American States
came into being formally in 1951 with the ratification
of the Pact of Bogota signed in 1948.

This Act gave

formal validity to the Rio Treaty of 1947 incorporating
it into the official Charter of the O.A.S.

The original

idea of a hemispheric system is attributed to Simon Bolivar.
Bolivar's dream of a cohesive union or "confederation" of
Latin American Provinces received its impetus on December 7,
1824 when the dictator of Peru and titular head of Great
Columbia sent the following message of invitation to the

g
former Spanish colonies.
The day our plenipotentiaries make the exchanges
of their powers will stamp in the diplomatic
history of the world an immortal epoch.
When,
after a hundred centuries, posterity shall search
for the origin of our public law, and shall
remember the compacts that solidified its destiny,
they will finger with respect the protocols of the
Isthmus.
In them they will find the plan of our
first alliances that shall sketch the mark of our
relations with the universe.7

6 The ex-colonies were Mexico, Central America,
Great Colombia (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela) Chile, Peru,
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, Bolivia and Paraquay.
Invitations were also sent to the United States of America,
Great Britain and Brazil.
7 John P. Humphrey, The Inter-American System;
A Canadian View (Toronto, 1942) , p. 23.

5
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The Congress which met at Panama June 23, 1826,
did not reflect Bolivar's grandiose scheme of alliance.

Of

g

the eleven invited, only four attended

and, as was to be

the case for decades after, resolutions were signed, alliances
postulated, agreements formulated, but nothing was ratified.
The international scene was too uncertain and the precedents
of newly gained independence too few to warrant anything
beyond pledges of mutual coexistence and interdependence
against colonialism.

The domination of Spain's Holy

Alliance, defeated in 1824, were soon replaced by fears
of United States Manifest Destiny in the latter years of the
nineteenth century.
Several states made efforts to further hispanic
solidarity, notably at Lima in 1847 and 1864 and at Santiago
in 1856, but the results were not immediately fruitful.

What

did emerge however was the basis for an international organ
ization that emenated almost one hundred years later.

These

first conferences dealt principally with two issues - arbitration
and the collection of public debts by governments.

Lima

settled the question of arbitration making mediation a point
of international law as it applied to the Latin American
Countries.

At Santiago the Drago Doctrine prohibiting the

collection of public debts by foreign governments, was promul
gated.

Both principles were later accepted by the U.S.A. at

8 The four Countries present were Mexico, Central
America, Colombia and Peru.
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the 1933 Montivideo Conference.
In summary of the period 1826-1889 it can be said
that the four major conferences served the necessary function
of continuing the "Liberator 1s"vision of a united association
of American Nations.

These early conferences were doomed to

failure for two reasons:

United States - Latin American

conflict of goals, and secondly, hispanic conflicts of interest.
"Not only did profound cultural differences exist
between the U.S.A. and its Latin American neighbours
which tended to obstruct the inter-American
Movements, but the policies of the U.S.A. were such
as to preclude Hemispheric c o o p e r a t i o n '.'9
American goals of isolationism from Europe and Manifest
Destiny at home were, of course, anathema to the republics to
the south.

The United States was indifferent at this time to

the area, and Bolivar's successors were too ambitious and too
fearful of losing their independence.

In fact, as Alvarez

points out below, there was a multiplicity of factors which
defied cooperation.
How, indeed, were these states to overcome the
enormous distances which separated them, the
absolute lack of intercommunication, the highly
developed spirit of national independence, the
bad blood engendered by the boundary disputes,
the conflicts over the navigation of rivers,
the baneful influences of civil wars due to the
personal ambitions of revolutionary leaders,the
lack of preparation of the people for political
life and the want of common traditions.10

9
10

A. Alvarez, op.cit., p. 288.
A.V. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, op.cit., p.13.
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The model was struck and through all this the vision
persisted but the essential common dominator, the U.S.A.
was missing.
The years between the Second Congress at Lima
(1864) and the Washington Conference of October 2, 1889
saw the wane of Pan-Americanism, but forces were emerging
in both the United States and Latin America which revived
the concept of a regional association of states to handle
problems such as arbitration, intervention and mutal defense.
James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State, presided over this
first gathering of American nations in Washington, and it
was largely his efforts which led to the creation of the
Union of American Republics and the Commerical Bureau of
American Republics
1910).

(which became the Pan-American Union in

It was possible to bring the states together at this

time because conditions in both areas of the hemisphere had
stabilized.

To be sure, many differences still existed,

(notably the 1879 War of the Pacific involving Peru, Chile,
and Bolivia), but in general the climate toward Washington
had changed favourably.

This new atmosphere of co-operation

was the aftermath of the cessation of southward expansion,
the abolition of slavery and the U.S. protests against the
French invasion of Mexico, the Spanish occupation of SantoDomingo, and the intervention of Madrid in Peru.

From

Washington's point of view, stability and peace in Latin
America meant increased markets and the exclusion of Europe
from the Americas.
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Successive conferences firmly established the
hegemony of the United States of America in Latin America
specifically the Caribbean.

The Southern Republics divided

amongst themselves were unable to form a counter-bloc to
the power of the United States.

Thus it was that Washington

was able to suppress the formal discussion of political
questions until 1933 at the Montevideo Conference.

In the

meantime, three additional meetings at Mexico City in 1901-2,
at Rio de Janeiro in 1906 and at Buenos Aires in 1910 had
produced significant results.

The Commerical Bureau was

given additional power to discuss cultural as well as commercial
matters, several institutions were created including the
International Commission of Jurists and the Pan-American
Sanitary Bureau, the first steps toward formal treaty alliance
were initiated, and despite U.S. intervention in the Caribbean
and Central American regions under the Roosevelt Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine, the Pan-American Union was created.
Although there were no regular conferences held between 1910
and 1923, numerous specialized conferences were convened,
primarily in response to the crisis problems arising from
World War I.
The resumption of conferences in Santiago/1923
and Havana, 1928, reflected the growing independence of the
Latin American Nations.

Membership in the League of Nations

and the defeat of the Central Powers drew the area closer to
European affairs than ever before.

This independence was

reflected in the conferences which failed to support a U.S.
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bid to take constructive steps towards regional, political
unity.

It was, in effect, a warning to Washington that the

policy question of intervention, so long considered a
prerogative of the United States in Latin America, must be
tempered.
How would one speak of inter-American solidarity,
Pan-Americanism or good neighbourliness, when the
stumbling block in the path of good relations was
nothing less than the most powerful republic of
the hemisphere?■*■-*The Good Neighbour policy of Franklin D.Roosevelt enunciated in 1933
had to be demonstrated by deeds.

In 1928, the U.S. had

signed two agreements in Washington, The General Convention
of Inter-American Conciliation and the General Treaty of
Inter-American Arbitration.

These agreements compelling the

signatories to arbitrate their disputes were deficient in
themselves in that they stipulated that both belligerents
in any single conflict must agree on the arbitrator.

In

addition, the United States Senate attached a further
reservation that required mutual agreement on the definition
of the problem before arbitration began (le compris).

The

result was that both agreements were still subordinate to
the Monroe Doctrine, and intervention was the order of the
day.
At the Montivideo Conference in 1933, this
multinationalization of the 1823 doctrine remained the major

11 L. Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks, 1943
in Humphrey, o p .c i t ., p.156.
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obstacle to formal union.

Since the Havana Conference, at

which Washington reserved to herself the right to interpret
the Monroe Doctrine and notwithstanding Roosevelt's timely
announcement of the Good Neighbour Policy, the Latin American
Nations had remained suspicious of the United States's
intentions.

Their fears were not justified.

When the

Convention on Rights and Duties came to a vote the U.S.
concurred, including the provision on non-intervention.
Three years later, at the Buenos Aires Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace the following Additional Protocol to
Non-Intervention was also signed by all parties:
The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissable
the intervention of any one of them, directly or
indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the
internal or external affairs of any other of the
Parties.
The violation of the provinces of this article
shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the
object of exchanging views and seeking methods
of peaceful adjustment. ^
This treaty can be regarded as being the turning
point of the Inter-American system toward a true security
organization.

In repudiating the right to intervene, the

Monroe Doctrine became the hemispheric guarantee of defensive
alliance.

Although it was still basically a weak agreement,

the principle of continentalization, the impetus to the
Rio Treaty of 1947, had been established.

In 1938, the

Congress of Lima created the Meeting of American Ministers
for Foreign Affairs thus endowing the principles of

12 This provision was later adopted as Article 15
of the Charter of the Organization of American States.
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arbitration and non-intervention with a concrete vehicle
for enactment.
years.

Events moved rapidly in the next several

World War II and the creation of the United Nations

became the stepping stones to the creation of the
Organization of American States.
In February of 1945, the Inter-American Conference
on Problems of War and Peace met at Mexico City to discuss
continental security and membership in the proposed United
Nations.

Firstly, the Act of Chapultepec extended the non

intervention Doctrine and collective security proposals to
include all states.

This was an extension of the Havana

resolution which had been directed at non-American states.
Political, economic and military sanctions were authorized
as legitimate weapons against any aggressor.

Secondly, a

reorganization of the Inter-American System was undertaken
not only to strengthen it but also to prepare for the
San Francisco Conference in April.
The resulting inter-American stand at San Francisco
was based on a clear conception by the American republics of
what their regional system was, and a determination to
preserve it.

The United Nations urged each state to deal

primarily with its regional system before taking problems to
the U.N.

Secondly, each regional organization was given the

right to defend itself in case of war.

These provisions

appear in the U.N. Charter as Articles 51 and 52.
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Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective
defense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the U . N ....
Article 52:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies
for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
•

•

• •

Having reorganized the structure of their system and caused
the provision,embodied above, to be included in the United
Nations Charter, the head of the United States delegation
proclaimed that it was the intention of the U.S.A.

"to

negotiate in the near future a treaty with its American
neighbours which will put the Act of Chapultepec on a
permanent basis in harmony with the World Charter."

13

Two years later, nineteen of twenty-one American
Republics

(exluding Ecuador and Nicaragua) met at Quitandinha,

Brazil and two years later, the parties signed the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro.
By this agreement the signatories reiterated their desire to
continue their existence as a regional organ under the
auspices of the United Nations, reaffirmed their commitment to
the principles set forth in the Act of Chapultepec, and
imposed obligations on themselves to refrain from intervention,
submit to arbitration and most significant, to come to their
mutual aid against any aggressor.

In addition, the Organ of

13 Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.,
June 13, 1945), p.1009.
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Consultation was given the power to rule on the action to
be undertaken in the event of aggression against a member
state other than armed attack and to decide by a two-thirds
majority the appropriate counteraction.

Because of the time

involved in convening a meeting of the Organ of Consultation
of Foreign Ministers however, the "Council of the Organization"
was empowered to act in its stead - a provision that has had
very significant consequences as will be seen below.
(It is noted here that the Rio Treaty by virtue
of Articles 3 and 6 commits the American "States" to
supporting Canada in the event of intervention that threatens
her territorial integrity or the "peace of America".

Thus,

Canada is protected from all forms of economic, political
and military aggression, although she has no reciprocal
obligations).
From March 30 to May 2, 1948, the Ninth Inter
national Conference of American States met at Bogota to
implement the reorganization resolution passed at Mexico
City in 1945.

The American republics attempted to give the

O.A.S. an organic core based on fundamental principles
negotiated after one hundred and twenty-two years of inter
action and conflict.

The Organization includes three

documents dealing with the following; defense and inter
vention

(Rio Treaty), arbitration and pacific settlement

(Pact of Bogota) and structure and function

(Charter).

The legal foundation for the Organization is a multilateral
agreement to which all states are bound according to the
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provisions of international law.
of the states

Ratification by two-thirds

(Article 108) was completed in December 13, 1951

with the deposit of the necessary instruments by Columbia.
By 1956 all the states had completed the process.

Since 1948

Trinidad and Tobago, a Commonwealth member, has been added
(1967) and Cuba suspended but the Organization falls short of
Bolivar's ideal in that the largest American state, Canada,
is a glaring omission.

In order to present a valid argument

either for or against Canadian membership, it is necessary
to devote some attention to the structure and functions of
the O.A.S. and its agencies.
Part two of the O.A.S. Charter established six
functional subordinate agencies to carry out the principles
and purposes established in Articles 1-4.
They are the following:
1. The Inter-American Conference, supreme organ of
the Organization which meets every five years to decide
general action and policy.
2. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs; which meets on?.request to consider problems of an
urgent nature and of common interest, and which serves as
the Organ of Consultation to deal with threats to the peace
and security of the Continent.
3. The Council, which is composed of one representative
from each state.
It may act provisionally as Organ of
Consultation.
The Council has three organs: the InterAmerican Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American
Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council.
4. The Pan American Union, which is the central and
permanent organ and General Secretariat of the O.A.S., with
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
5. The Inter-American Specialized Conferences, which
deal with special technical matters and develop specific
aspects of inter-American cooperation.
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6.
The Inter-American Specialized Organizations,
which have specific functions with respect to technical
matters of common interest to the American States.
There,
are six such agencies:
Inter-American Children's Institute,
the I-A. Commission of Women, the I-A. Indian Institute,
I - A . Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the Pan American
Health Organization and Pan American Institute of Georgraphy
and History.
The supreme organ, the Inter-American Conference
is the oldest having been formed in 1889, and meets according
to Charter every five years, but sometimes special conferences
are h e l d . ^

It is the parent organ being directly involved

in the overall administration of the system but has surrendered
much of its influence to the Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers, and so has become more of a coordinating
body.

The I-A. conference for example, has the theoretical

power to mediate conflicts and decide peace-keeping policy, but
in reality, the organ is too large, too unwieldy and too
impractical given the time element in any crisis.

In addition,

the Rio Treaty specifically authorizes the Organ of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers

(or in its stead the

Provisional Organ) to consider questions involving sanctions
where the peace and security of the Continent is endangered.
Finally, the decisions of the Inter-American Conference are
subject to ratification by the national government adhering
to its ruling and this consumes valuable time also.

No

legislation is binding in the Conference although the arguments
are still divided over treaties and resolutions and the
difference between legal and moral obligations.

Under present

14 An example of a special conference was the
Caracas Conference in 1954.
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interpretation however, only treaties are binding15 and the
Inter-American Conference is restricted to a recommending
rol e.
The Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers/
mentioned above, also functions as the Organ of Consultation.
By Charter, this body meets only "to consider problems of
an urgent nature and of common interest to the American
States....

16

This organ is the modern successor of the

Meeting of Foreign Ministers created at Lima

(1936) , and

provides machinery for the implementation of cooperative
consultation and action.

The Meeting convenes at the request

of one member with the agreement of the others and is able
to consider any and all questions.

The Inter-American

Conference, in dealing with broad policy direction, complements
the Meeting which initiates specific policy for ad hoc
situations.Like the Inter-American Conference only recommendations
to members are possible, but the moral obligation in this
body is stronger.

Functioning as the Organ of Consultation is

the most critical power delegated by the Charter because this
body is charged with the preservation of peace and security 17
In view of the aforementioned inability of the Organ of
Consultation to convene quickly, Article 12 of the Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance authorizes the Governing Board of the

15 See A . J . Thomas and A.V. Thomas, for a thorough
discussion of this problem, o p .c i t ., pp. 67-73.
16

Article 39 of the Charter.

17 Articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty, Articles
25 and 43 of the Charter.
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Pan American Union to act in its place as the Provisional
Organ of Consultation.

In its function as the Organ of

Consultation, decisions arrived at by two-thirds of the
Council's members are binding.

18

The scope of restrictions

available to the Organ of Consultation are outlined in
Article 8 of the Rio Treaty and need not be listed here.
In a majority of situations the Council, under Article 6,
has called for a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers
to consider the conflict but has set no date for this meeting.
In the interim, the Council has taken action itself, acting
as the Provisional Organ of Consultation.

The Council,

having taken the necessary steps to handle the problem, then
cancels the proposed meeting of foreign ministers.
The Council of the Organization exercises adminis
trative and supervisory control over the operations of the
Pan-American Union at Washington, in addition to its function
as Provisional Organ of Consultation.
represented by an ambassador
representative).

Each state is

(usually the state's Washington

Article 51 of the Charter charges the

Council with implementation of all O.A.S. resolutions and
directives.

Article 53 requires the Council to co-ordinate

the activities of the Organization regarding all subordinate
bodies, the specialized agencies, the Inter-American Council,
as well as relations between all agencies and departments of
the Organization.

The three organs of the Council, listed

18 Article 20 of the Rio Treaty does not demand that
a nation be required to use armed force except by its own
consent.
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above, exist to promote the internal welfare and modernization
of the various member states in each Council's particular
technical sphere, and to coordinate their work with other
international organizations such as those established by the
United Nations.

In addition, specialized conferences are

held from time to time

( three hundred to date) to bring

experts together for discussion of internal problems common
to all the countries in South America.
The Pan American Union's duties are outlined in
Articles 82, 83 and 84 of the Charter and consist principally
of directing the activities of the three Councils.

Additional

subordinate agencies nominally under P.A.U. direction include
the Inter-American Peace Committee
Defence Board

(1940), Inter-American

(194 2), the Ad Hoc Committee of Special

Representatives of Presidents of the American States

(1956),

the Informal Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

(1959),

(1959) , Inter-

American Nuclear Energy Commission

(1957) and the Special

Consultative Committee on Security

(1962).

Added to these

organs are numerous bodies of a semi-official nature such as
the Inter-American Radio Office and the Inter-American
Postal Union.
The institutional functions of the O.A.S. and its
agencies have been presented as outlined in the Charter and
the Rio Treaty.

A further discussion of the Organization

in the several areas of defence, economics, social welfare,
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adherence to the spirit of the Charter, and respect for
the principles of non-intervention and arbitration follows
below in an attempt to decide if the O.A.S. has been success
ful.

Upon the conclusions drawn here depends, to a

significant extent, the prospects for Canadian membership
and the recommendations for change in the O.A.S.

Article 4

of the Charter lists the purposes of the Organization.

To

what extent purposes accord with practice is the subject of
this third section.
Article 4 reads as follows:
The Organization of American States...proclaims the
following essential purposes:
a.

To strengthen the peace and security of the
continent.

b.

To prevent possible causes of difficulties and
to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes
that may arise among the Member States.

c.

To provide for common action on the part of
those states in the event of aggression.

d.

To seek the solution of political, juridical,
and economic problems that may arise among
them; and

e.

To promote, by cooperative action, their
economic, social and cultural development.

I intend to discuss the areas embodied in this statement of
purposes under the heads "Political" and "Socio-economic"
objectives.
conflict,

This first category concerns

the

mutual cooperation for defense, and

prevention of
the maintenance

of peace and security in the Americas.
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Socio-economic goals pertain to the future internal
viability of the members and require long term solutions
unlike political problems which usually necessitate an
ad hoc reaction to specific problems.
Political Goals;
According to the Charter of the O.A.S., the
Organization is committed to the general goal of preventing
conflicts of both an intramural and extra continental
nature,

(Articles 4, 24, 25), and in the event of aggression,

committment to the collective defence of the victim.
Aggression, by Charter, includes economic, political and
cultural intervention as well as military.

It is a further

obligation of member'states to minimize conditions of
potential conflict

(Article 4b ) , to promote peace

to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes

(4a), and

(4c) .

Upon

the degree that the Organization has succeeded in accomplish
ing these purposes, will the success or failure of the
alliance be judged.
The adoption of treaties and resolutions does not,
of course, eliminate the importance given to internal
economic and political factors within a nation as the prime
movers of that state's actions.

Nor does the creation of

international institutions ensure the implementation of
principles and purposes.

The O.A.S., like its counterparts,

all over the globe, can only promote, resolve, encourage
and if necessary, threaten.

Enforcement prospects are

governed by the dynamics of inter-state relations and
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national interest.
It is in the protection of the sovereignity
and independence of states that the Organization
has achieved its greatest success and won its
major plaudits.19
Since 1948, the O.A.S.

(backed by the military

predominance of the U.S.A.) has succeeded in the sphere of
continental defense.

Since 1948, the only major threat,

Cuba, has been isolated through the cooperation of the
Member states under the Rio Treaty in legitimizing Kennedy's
embargo.
The Inter-American Defence Board, Juanta Internacional
Defensa

(JID) created at the Third Meeting of Consultation of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1942 is the theoretical vehicle
for implementing O.A.S. military policy.

Since 1948, the prime

importance of the J.I.D. has been, in fact, as a cementing
agent that produces a degree of mutual cooperation, solidarity
and standardization of procedure.

Under the leadership of

the United States of America, the Organization of American
States has implemented the spirit of the 1954 Caracas
Resolution to the extent that the possibility of a successful
armed attack on the continent is negligible.

Thus, the

major function of O.A.S. security procedures today, is
directed toward the elimination of inter-American conflict.
Subversive activities sponsored by one government
against a member state are usually reactions to inherited

19 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes,
November 18, 1949.
(Ottawa, 1949).
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long-standing nationalist or territorial disputes; whereas,
coups are, in the main, old fashioned power struggles.
The former are the responsibility of the Council and its
organs, while the latter are supposedly outside the realm
of O.A.S. jurisdiction.
Historically, the O.A.S. has been extremely
successful in the amelioration of differences between members.
Despite the fragmentation and disunity of the American
states, the Organization has successfully mediated several
crisis situations.

20

In some instances

(eg. Panama invasion

of 1959) the O.A.S. has endeavored to establish its presence
in the country by means of an investigating committee of
neutral members which has the political backing of two-thirds
of the member-states and the military support of the U.S.A.
Faced with such supervision, the conflicting parties are
loathe to continue aggressive measures.

In most cases a

return to the status quo ante-bellum is successfully concluded.
The goal of the Organization in the area of
peace-keeping is primarily the restoration of peace and only

20 John C. Drdir, in The Organization of American States
and the Hemisphere Crisis, (New York, 1962) lists seven crisis
that the Organization has been successful in negotiating.
1949-50, Dominican Republic v Haiti; 1954, Guatemala Communist
coup; 1955, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, invasion; 1957, Honduras v
Nicaragria, boundary dispute; 1959; Panama v Cuba, guerilla
invasion; Nicaragua v Costa Rica, guerilla action; 1960, Dominican
Republic v Venezuela, terrorist activity; 1962, Cuban Missile
Crisis.
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secondly, the solving of the problems leading to the
conflict.

In ideological clashes

(eg. Costa Rican-Nicaraguan

conflict of 1955) the O.A.S. record is less impressive.
Jerome Slater argues from an historical basis in fact that
the effectiveness of the O.A.S. in these cases depends on
the compatibility of U.S. objectives and Latin American
ideology.

21

governments

Thus dictatorships were preferable to leftist
(eg. Dominican Republic and Brazil)

for many years,and

even today, rank higher in Washington's value system than
the governments of countries like Cuba.

Countries like

Mexico and Argentina have become alienated because of this
Washington-imposed ideological soul
security system.

in the collective

There is some agitation amongst Canadians

regarding U.S. domination of the O.A.S.

The 1954 Caracas

Resolution is an excellent example of United States
manipulation of the Organization to reflect its own ideological
views.

This problem, however serious, has not over-ridden

the effectiveness of the Organization and it is possible to
state that the O.A.S. has been successful in the promotion
and maintenance of peace.
As noted earlier, intra-state power struggles
are outside O.A.S. jurisdiction.

In reality however, U.S.

leadership has made the O.A.S. a vehicle for the maintenance
of preferential regimes.

In Guatemala, Cuba and the

Dominican Republic, the Organization has intervened under

21 Jerome Slater, The Organization of American
States and United States Foreign Policy, (Ohio^ 1967) p. 2.
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the guise of the Caracas Resolution.

Only the Guatemalan

case is discussed here to illustrate the illegality of
O.A.S. action; Cuba and the Dominican Republic will be
considered in depth in Chapter four.

The situation in

Guatemala in 1954 deserves special mention here because it
illustrates an important concept that potential member states
would be wise to clarify before committing themselves.
The vagueness and ambiguity of the Caracas
Resolution in dealing with the concept of "aggression"
enabled the U.S. to 'legally' oppose the government of an
independent Guatemala and cause it to be overthrown.

The

presence of numerous known communists in ;the Arbenz govern
ment and the threat of a takeover they represented prompted
Washington to use the nationalization of the United Fruit
Company as an excuse for U.S. intervention and support of
the guerilla army under Castillo Armas.

Using the anti

communist resolution,the U.S. contended that acceptance of
U.S.S.R. arms by the Arbenz government was a threat to the
peace and security of the continent.

Under the Rio Treaty,

the United States was able to sponsor an investigation by
the Inter-American Peace Committee thus excluding U.N.
action in the area.

The Arbenz government fell!

The

interpretation of the concept of "aggression" as outlined
in the Rio Treaty and the Charter, is therefore; the object
of subjective interpretation.

It is not difficult to visualize

the conflict in Ottawa had Canada been a member of the O.A.S.

241406
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Support of an Organization that is dominated by one nation's
value system reduces the possibilities of compromise and
total cooperation.
The greatest danger to the O.A.S. at this time is
that the United States in attempting to preserve its
hegemony in Latin America will ignore its special responsib
ilities in the areas of peace-keeping and collective security.
The regular application of treaties and the standardization
of a clear and concise basis for O.A.S. action should be the
immediate goals of the member states.

As long as Washington

insists on endowing the Organization with an ideological
soul, the right of self defence as outlined in the Rio
Treaty is impractical, if not fanciful.
In conclusion, the O.A.S. has served as a
regional background to U.S. power in diminishing the-threat
to the Western hemisphere.

In supporting the principles of

collective security, the U.S. has been able to cloak its
unilateral actions in the respectability of the Organization
of American States thus avoid political questioning

at

home, confrontation in the United Nations and criticism in
Latin America.

In the realm of peace-keeping, inconsis

tencies regarding interpretation and policy have developed
to the point of an open split between the U.S. and several
other member states, such as Mexico.

To some extent, the

basic differences existing between the U.S. and Latin
America and among the Latin American governments themselves,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

have prevented further consolidation of interests and
goals.

However in the sphere of international relations,

the O.A.S. has been more potent and effective than in the
areas of social and economic development.
The pursuit of hemispheric stability has resulted
in important internal developments for the Latin American
countries.

The success of the O.A.S. in preventing open

conflict has enabled the other members to stabilize the
amount of money and resources usually devoted to defence,
to minimize the appeal of radical factions within the states

22

and, most important, permitted more attention to be devoted
to the solution of domestic ills of a social and economic
nature.

It is to a consideration of these problems that the

remainder of this chapter is devoted.
It is of course, difficult to differentiate between
the economic and the social spheres of life.

The O.A.S.

Charter combines the two areas under one heading, Specialized
Agencies

(Article 63).

The Inter American-Economic and

Social Council, established as a permanent organ in 1948, was
the result of over sixty years of hispanic pressure on the
United States to aid in these areas as well as defence.
Since the days of Bolivar, the Latin American countries have
recognized common social and economic retardation as the
core of their domestic stagnation and external frailty.

22 Canada has Hysteria over Cuban Situation,
Financial Post, (Dec. 17, 1960), p. 2.
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Since 1914, when the Commercial Bureau of American Republics,
the first concrete step toward Pan-Americanism was
created, concern has revolved around economic progress as
much as security.

In 1939, when financial instability and

World War II necessitated additional cooperation, the
Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee
was created.

The establishment of the Inter-American

Development Commission

(1940) and the publishing of the

Economic Charter of America became reflections of the growing
awareness in Latin America of the immediate need for
cooperation and joint development in the areas of trade,
tariffs, taxes, price ceilings, resources, foreign exchange,
inflation, devaluation, industrialization, agrarian reform
and a host of other spheres.

Thus, in 1945 the republics

established the IA-ECOSOC to investigate and recommend joint
measures to tackle the economic and social problems of the
member states.
The role of the U.S.A. in the developmental process
is of primary importance to the successful reorganization
and reform of the Latin American domestic structure.
Political instability, military prominence and the internal
policies of the United States have been such that Washington
did not heed Latin American pleas for economic and social
reform until recently.

The United States refused to accept

the responsibilities its wealth and hegemony within the
inter-American system placed in its hands.

Small numbers of

technicians and limited credit have trickled from Washington
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since 1942 through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs
and the Truman Four Point Plan, but U.S. business capital
was loathe to penetrate too deeply into many of the unpred
ictable areas of Central and South America.

The threat

of nationalization and/or expropriation, high tariff walls,
small markets, political instability, discriminatory taxes,
government regulations, and the presence of more favourable
markets elsewhere, all combined to restrict profound U.S.
involvement.23
At the Fourth Extraordinary meeting of the
IA-ECOSOC in Rio de Janeiro, November 22, 1954, the United
States made its last stand in opposition to a vast regional
economic system.

In August of 1956 Operation Pan America

was put forth by Brazil as a possible agent to deal with
problems of trade, development, industrialization, technolog
ical advancement and related contingencies on a collective
basis.

In September, 1958, the United States reversed its

traditional opposition to a regional financial institution
and the Committee of Twenty-one was created to blueprint
the necessary steps.

24

This Act of Bogota, as it was formally

ratified, contained four chapters that related to the
conditions prevalent in all Latin American states to varying
degrees.

The headings were "Measures for Social Improvement",

23 Thomas, op.cit., presents an excellent discussion
of the problem, pp.379-81.
24
"The Hemisphere Starts a Bank", Americas, Vol. XI,
(June, 1959), p .2.
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"Social Development",

"Economic Development", and "Multi

lateral Cooperation".

The success of the Organization of

American States in dealing with these problem areas will be
discussed below separately.
In December of 1959, the Inter-American Development
Bank

(IADB) was inaugerated with a budget of one billion

dollars

(U.S. contribution five hundred million)

for the

purpose of making credit readily available to the Latin
American countries.

Eighty-five percent of the bank's

resources were allotted for commercial loans and fiften percent
for "soft" loans to finance operations of a non-self-liquidating
nature.

25

Encouraged by the support given to the IADB, the

U.S. called for a special cabinet level economic conference
in Uruguay.

26

By the Act of Punta del Este, Washington

committed twenty billion dollars to the Alliance for Progress.27
The Alliance for Progress was formulated at a
White House meeting between President Kennedy and the Latin
American Ambassadors in March 13, 1961.

The aura of unity

and optimism stimulated rapid adoption of the plan by the
nineteen Latin American republics

(excluding Cub a ) , and the

program was inaugerated on August 17, 1961.

The basic

documents underlying the Alliance are the "Declaration to the

25

Thomas, op.cit., p . 388.

26
"The O.A.S. in Action,: The Task at Montivideo,"
Americas, Vol. XIII, (August, 1961), p.31.
27

7.7 billion dollars up to 1967.
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Peoples of America" and the "Charter of Punta del Este
Establishing an Alliance for Progress Within the Framework
of Operation Pan America".

The close partnership between

the United States and Latin America born of World War II,
was recreated by the Alliance in which aid and reform
became multi-national, cooperative goals.
The Alliance has not been a dynamic success this fact cannot be disputed - but neither has it been the
outright failure predicted by so many sceptics.

The

Alliance has produced positive innovations in the social
structure which are unmeasureable at this time or are not
part of an analysis of a country's gross national product.
In both the economic and social realm, positive gains are
being made.

The major successes of the program are outlined

here as indicators of progress, however minor.

28

General:
Domestic revenues rose 4 2 percent from 1961 to
1966 in seventeen countries.
5.6 percent per annum.

Tax collections increased

Central government capital outlay

rose 32 percent, with significant increases in education
(48.6 percent) and agriculture
1966).

(32.5 percent from 1963 to

Defense expenditures were stable at $1.8 billion

annual average for the last four years, or less than 2 percent
of total gross national product.

Of this, 10 percent or

less is for new equipment.

28 Department of State Bulletin, No. 59.
D.C., September 2, T961D .

(Washington,
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Industrialization:
Eight countries, with 87 percent of the total
GNP and 8 2 percent of the population of the developing
Alliance countries, showed manufacturing up 42 percent from
1960 to 1966.

Mining rose 22 percent.

Agricultural Productivity:
Nineteen countries averaged a 3 percent increase
in net agricultural production since 1960, but food production
rose 27 percent for the period 1961-67.

Major increases

reflect newly cultivated lands, mostly medium and small farms.
New agricultural on-farm credit now reaches about 8 million
people, or 6 percent of the rural population, who had no
available credit before.

Since 1963 Latin American central

government expenditures on agriculture increased 38.5 percent.
But production is barely keeping pace with population growth.
Agrarian Reform:
Fifteen countries have enacted agrarian reform laws
and created administrative institutions to carry them out.
Seven hundred thousand families were newly settled and 450,000
of them received land titles.

Total land distributed is

above 8 2 million acres, or 6.3 percent of the arable land of
Latin America.

Fifty to sixty percent of this was "new land"

(public domain); 30-40 percent was expropriated or purchased;
10 percent was the result of private colonization efforts.
Nearly 4 million people have benefited.

But the number of

landless families is increasing.
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Adult Illiteracy:
Available statistics show a general decrease in
the number of adult illiterates, with two out of three Latin
Americans now being able to read and write.

Since the

beginning of the Alliance, central government outlay for
education has increased nearly 62 percent.

Sixteen countries

increased their education expenditures during 1967; 13
diverted more than 15 percent of their expenditures to
education.
Fifty-six percent of primary school age children
are in school compared with 49 percent in 1961, while
population increased about 3 percent annually.

Following are

specific areas of school growth:
Primary:

Graduates increased 86 percent, teachers

61 percent, and classrooms 51 percent.
Secondary:

Enrollment and graduates doubled.

Teachers almost doubled.
University:

Enrollment growth rate averaged 9.5

percent annually during the Alliance years.

This is higher

than growth rate in U.S. universities during the same period.
There are approximately 1 million students enrolled in
Latin American universities, double those enrolled prior to
the Alliance.
Vocational:

Graduates in 14 countries more than

doubled, with 235,000 in 1967 against 106,000 in 1960.
Agricultural

(secondary):

Enrollment increased
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2.5 times; enrollment tripled in higher agricultural education.
Life Expectancy:
Infant mortality went down 12 percent through 1964
while child mortality dropped 20 percent.

Latin American

population, meanwhile, is growing faster than any other world
region and influences every aspect of Latin American develop
ment.
Malaria has been stopped in 10 countries, affecting
11.5 million people.
Potable water is available to 70 percent of the
urban population of thirteen countries.

Six countries report

providing potable water to 50 percent of the rural population.
Twenty-three new medical schools opened.
increased 26 percent and nurses 60 percent.

Physicians

However, 13,800

more doctors per year are needed for the next five years,
and too many are being drained off to developed countries.
Health centers and posts showed a 30-40 percent
increase from 1960 to 1965.
Construction of Low-Cost Housing:
The best indicators here are in the growth of
housing co-ops and savings and loan associations.

Co-ops

numbered about 2,000 with 360,000 members in 1967, compared
with 400 co-ops and 65,000 members in 1960.
Savings and loan associations increased from
23 in four countries to 175 in 12 countries.

Depositors rose
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from 50,000 to over 750,000, with deposits of over $300
million and loans of $433 million to 82,000 borrowers.
Under the AID housing guaranty program nearly
12,000 units were completed from 1964 to 1967.
Price Levels:
Inflation has been reduced in those countries
where it was a serious threat.

The rate in Chile went down

from 39 percent in 1964 to 22 percent in 1967.

Brazil cut

inflation from 140 percent in 1964 to 25 percent in 1967,
and Argentina was down from a 1966 peak of 32.3 percent to
an estimated 10 percent in 1968.
Foreign Exchange:
The average annual increase in earnings from
exports was 6.4 percent from 1961 to 1966.

Following a

world trade slowdown, earnings in 1967 failed to register
any increase.

The United States is working with the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to
develop guidelines for temporary preferences by developed
countries for all developing countries.
An Inter-American Export Promotion Center was
created in January 1968 to stimulate the sale of Latin
American manufactured products.
$500,000 to this program.

The United States pledged

Also, the International Coffee

Agreement was strengthened by creation of a Coffee Diversi
fication Fund.
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Private Sector Participation in the Alliance:
The private sector in the home hemisphere and
elsewhere is being increasingly encouraged to invest in
econcmic development of Alliance countries.

The U.S.-

created Inter-American Investment Development Center in one
short year of activity has promoted twenty-four possible
projects, with an estimated investment potential of $25 million.
Economic Integration:
Since 1961 the five Central American countries Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica increased intrazonal trade 600 percent (from a very low
initial base, admittedly) through their common market.

The

eleven South American countries of the Latin American Free
Trade Association increased intraregional imports 135 percent
and made 10,000 tariff and nontariff concessions.
Principal trade integration developments in the
last two years follow:
- Panama has been invited to join the Central
American Common Market on a progressive basis.
- A joint Latin American Free Trade Association
Central American Common Market coordinating committee was
established.
- LAFTA foreign ministers have met on the process
of conversion into a common market.
- Meetings of the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council have been held on the effects of Common
Market integration.
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- six countries

(Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,

Ecuador, Peru and Venzuela) have organized in a subregional
Andean Development Corporation.
- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
have agreed to cooperate in the development of the 1,235,000
square mile River Plate Basin with a population of 50 million.
- Further steps were taken to establish an interAmerican communications network by 1973 at the recent meeting
in Rio de Janeiro of the Inter-American Telecommunication
Commission

(CITEL).
Multinational infrastructure programs received

added support through new pledges of $1.2 billion to the
Inter-American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations
(FSO).

The United States will contribute $900 million over

the next three years to this increase, in addition to $2
million from the U . S .-financed Social Progress Trust Fund to
the IDB's Pre-Investment Fund for Latin American Integration.
The O.A.S. Special Development Assistance Fund
provides technical assistance and training in support of
multilateral efforts.
Infrastructure works are already supporting
integration.

Electric power production is up from 38 billion

kilowatts to 100 billion kilowatts.

Total road mileage

increased by 16 percent, and paved road mileage by 58 percent.
In addition, the preparation of sound development
programs, the compilation and analysis of basic factual
information, hitherto notoriously sketchy, the setting of
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national priorities geared to economic and social development
and the dissemination of large quantities of United States
technical aid were the immediate results of the Alliance for
Progress.

The critical disappointment of the Alliance has

been the lack of integration and positive direction it has
fostered.

Faith in the Alliance is reserved to the few in

any Latin American country.

To most the Alliance means

simply greater U.S. aid available and more severe competition
for that aid.

Thus, multinational development programs in

the fields of telecommunications, irrigation, and hydroelectric
power are subordinated to national projects which may or may
not have equal urgency.

In any event, the fight for the U.S.

dollar often encourages the formation of grandiose schemes
while widening the gulf between the nations.

Furthermore,

the Alliance despite claims by Latin American leaders, is
not a Latin American project.

Washington's allotment of

1.1 billion dollars per annum is distributed by projects on
which the decisions are made in Washington.

The goals of

"self-help" and "reform" remain worthwhile concepts but
their specific meanings must be written and implemented by
the people of each nation.

If the growth of the Central

and South American nations depends on private investment,
as presumed in the Charter of Punta del Este, the Latin
American nations must assume responsibility for creating the
necessary political and ideological climate, and for
establishing specific priorities in the sphere of social
reform.
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New attention has been given to the problems
of integration and responsibility especially during the
conferences at Buenos Aires

(March, 1966),at Washington

(June, 1966) and at the meeting of the Presidents of the
American Nations

(April, 1967).

A Latin American

Common Market excluding the United States of America
would of necessity foster integration and interdependence.
But even at this embryonic stage, as embodied in the
Latin American Free Trade Area

(LAFTA), the lack of

diversification and specialization, the recent birth of
most home industries, the disparity in national wealth, the
dependence on the United States market and countless other
factors geared to parochialism and the need to export many
of the same products has resulted in the refusal to make
concessions and the creation and maintenance of high tariff
walls by the members.

The United States, in spite of its

financial aid, has come under increasingly severe criticism
from many quarters both at home and abroad.

Export pre

ferences, A.I.D. liberalization, Export-Import Bank loans,
and an increase in the quantity of aid to that approaching
the post-World War II Marshall Plan to Europe, have been
the primary suggestions to overcome the stagnation within
the area of economic development under the Alliance for
29
progress.

29 Hubert K. May, Problems and Prospects of the
Alliance for Progress. (New York, 1968) , p . 20-1.
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The political goals of the Alliance for Progress
as outlined in the Charter
been ignored.

of Punta del Este have largely

A cursory scanning of the purposes of the

Alliance drive home the point that the economic and social
development of the Latin American states must be viewed
as the alternative to armed rebellion and that development
must be geared to the preservation of democracy.
The elites in Latin American countries lack
ideological direction, concentrate on the immediate benefits
of the U.S. dollar, ignore the advice of and refuse to
permit the participation of student groups, peasant
cooperatives, trade unions, and in general impose reform
from above rather than responding to the masses.
Alliance thus

The

assumes the posture of an independent organ

ization run by the few and dictated to the many.

Based on

successes to date, the accounting in the fiscal area is
still in the red.

For example, the 2.5 percent G.N.P.

growth envisioned by the Alliance in 1961, has not been
reached.

To a significant extent this failure to achieve

even this modest growth rate is primarily the result of
two factors; the 3 percent growth rate in Latin America,and the
large percentage of Latin American budgets geared to defence
expenditures.

The 1.6 percent average growth rate in

G.N.P. cannot keep pace with the rise in population and
government expenditures of 1.5 b i l l i o n o n defence, use up
the great bulk of American aid.
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In order to coordinate and re-direct the
movements of the Alliance, the Committee of Experts, and the
Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress
(C.I.A.P.) must both be assigned a greater degree of
technical and political responsibility in order to achieve
cohesive political developments that will inspire a
committment to the Alliance.

Senator J.K. Javits presents

a persuasive case for L.A.F.T.A. if the Alliance can
30
become relevant to the people.

The longer the people

wait, the greater are their hopes and frustrations and in
the not-too-distant future the more violent their
revolution.
Without discussing all the reasons, the Alliance
has achieved its greatest success in converting the image
of Latin America

from an area of constant instability,

to one of relatively stability with infrequent interruptions.
Foreign investors in the United States and Canada are
viewing this area with a more favourable attitude.

In

the political sphere of long term direction however, the
Alliance has failed to provide coordinated leadership and
cohesive integration, and the United States has chosen
to ignore the Alliance's commitment to regionalism, and
populism.

Perhaps a common market, though not a realistic

30 Jacob K. Javits, "Last Chance for a Common
Market", Foreign Affairs, Vol. LIV. (April, 1967), p . 449-462.
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solution at present, will become the sole alternative.

31

The Alliance, like the Organization of American
States has only been partially successful in fulfulling
the duties assigned to it under its original Charter.
Canadian participation within the Alliance as a donor
nation could contribute little financial aid to augment
its present contributions in the form of "soft loans" and
outright grants.

Indeed, Ottawa would do well to urge for

a restructuring of the Alliance along the lines suggested
above, before committing herself to supporting it.

The

structure and functions of the O.A.S. and the present
direction and uses of the huge financial resources committed
to the Alliance for Progress suggest, as I have shown,
that a restructuring and a new dedication to original
purposes and goals is vitally necessary, and should be a
prerequisite for Canadian membership.

31 The question of economic integration as.a
prerequisite for political integration in Latin America
is thoroughly discussed in an article by Earnest B. Haas
and Philippe C. Schmitter entitled "Economics and
Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections
About Unity in Latin America", International Policital
Communities (New York, 1966), pp.258-300.
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CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Canadian attitude toward Latin America
has traditionally been one of indifference and ignorance.
Shielded by the United States, separated by vast geographical
distances, an absence of historical connections, and with
the exception of the Caribbean countries, possessing different,
sometimes antagonistic, political systems, Canadians found
little to warrant profound investigation of the area's
inhabitants.

Historically, culturally, politically, geograph

ically, Europe was closer to Canada and the fact that Canada
was land-linked to South America through the United States,
was not sufficient to justify more than passing reference in
Canadian newspapers to Pan Americanism, gunboat diplomacy
or revolutionary coups.
In addition, the early years of the Canadian nation
were ones of domestic preoccupation.

Until the Balfour

Declaration of 1926, the United States was suspicious of
the British Dominion.
If colonies, possessions or dominions, whose
foreign relations are controlled by European
States, were represented in these conferences,
the influences and policies of European Powers
would be injected into the discussion and
disposition of questions affecting the political
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entities of this hemisphere.
Whatever value
such conferences would have, it would not be
that attaching to a conference distinctly American.3 2
Canadians were aware of U.S. hegemony in the area, and for
many,Pan Americanism was a cloak for U.S.
and expansion.

"Manifest Destiny"

In these early years, close allegiance to

the Crown was the safeguard against this implicit dangeriof:'"
U.S. imperialism being directed north into Canada.

This

mutual distrust of motives continued to hamper close U.S.Canadian relations to varying degrees until 1939, when
Mackenzie King announced publicly that Canadian membership
in the Pan American Union was "a possibility which should
be given consideration in the future".

33

Although the

disclosure of official government interest in joining the
Union was the first indication of serious Canadian interest,
the war intervened and Canada, an active belligerent, was
unable to follow through with concrete action.
The year 1940 saw a reawakening of Canadian
attention to Latin America.

Unable to obtain the necessary

loans needed for the Canadian war effort because of the U.S.
declaration of neutrality, Ottawa looked south of the U.S.
for a hard currency market.

Markets in Latin America were

readily accessable because the .German occupation of Europe

32 Government Printing Office, 1928. Vol. I. p. 583
as quoted in Anglin, Douglas C., "United States Opposition
to Canadian Membership in the Pan American Union: A
Canadian View", International Organization, No. 1, Vol. XV.
(Winter, 1961).
33 Debates, March 30, 1930. P. 2430. Statement by
Mackenzie K i n g .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45

had eliminated Latin American markets on that continent.'
i

These diplomatic exchanges were carried out between Ottawa
and Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and preferential trade
agreements were signed between Ottawa and Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador and Argentina.

However, even with the increased

in trade with Latin America, approximately 29.4 percent,
Canada still sold only 2.25 percent of her total exports to
this a r e a . ^

More important, however, was the fact that

initial contacts had been made and had proved fruitful as
well as harmonious.
Tin the post World War Two years, Canadian
preoccupation with the United Nations obscured any appeal
the P.A.U. might have had for Canada.) For example, in
April of 1947, United States Senator Vandenburg issued an
invitation to Canada to join the Union, but events were
such that Ottawa and the Canadian people were already afraid
of regional organizations undermining the New World
Organization.

Even after collectivism was recognized in

Canada as being a necessary evil, Prime Minister St. Laurent
declared in 1949, that the nation's destiny lay with a
North Atlantic Union and, he continued,
it has not appeared to us that there would be
any decided advantages in formal membership in
the Pan American Union.
If there were any advantages
we would join.35

34 Commercial Intelligence Journal, Canadian Trade
with Latin America, May 17, 1941. pp.595-600.
35 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes,
November 18, 1949. p. 20.
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John Holmes believes that the U.S. invitation was issued
at this time because of the growing Soviet threat and
O

the strategic significance of Canada.

£

The offer was

abandoned, however, presumably because of the Canadian
sponsorship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
which effectively tied Ottawa to the anti-communist league
of nations as well as the Rio Treaty would have done.
The decade following the Bogota Conference which
founded the Organization of American States as the
successor to the P.A.U., witnessed an atmosphere of polite
detachment existent between Ottawa and Washington regarding
membership in the Organization of American States.

The

election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1957
coincided with a revival of Canadian interest in Latin
America.

Developments in Cuba in 1959 and the Dominican

Republic in 1961, served to keep the question of Canadian
involvement before the government for some tim e , but the
new administration's interest waned.

After 1960,attention

in Ottawa was geared to the U.S. policy regarding Cuba
and a fear of the effect Canada's decision to retain its
representative in Havana and to continue trade with Castro
would have on Canadian-American

r e l a t i o n s . ^

36 Holmes, John W . , Canada and Pan America, luncheon
address delivered to the American Historical Association in
Toronto, December, 1967.
37
"Canada has Hysteria Over Cuban Situation",
Financial Post, (December 17, 1960), p. 2.
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IIn May, 1961, the question of Canadian membership
rose again.

President John F. Kennedy, in an address to

the Canadian Parliament, invited Canada to take her "rightful
place" in the Organization of American States .\ The
government declined the offer, ostensibly because of the
lack of a popular directive, but most likely because Mr.
Diefenbaker viewed acceptance of Washington's invitation as
bowing to U.S. pressure.

It is important to note here that

most of the Canadian newspapers and journals supported
Mr. Diefenbaker1s stand.

O O

The Cuban missile crisis further

strengthened the contention of many to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude.

The Cuban crisis brought home two profound facts

to Canadians; firstly, the Canadian people realized how
vulnerable their security was when the two super-powers
decided to test each other, and secondly; the manner in
which Washington bypassed the O.A.S. in imposing the blockade
on Cuba, demonstrated that the Canadian position was more
favourable outside the Organization.

The year 1965, brought

the Dominican crisis in April and the open intervention of
U.S. troops in Santo Domingo was condemned in editorials
across Canada.

In 1967, the acceptance of Trinidad and

Tobago, Commonwealth members, stimulated new speculation
that Canada would now join, but the movement was weak and
shortlived.

In October 1968, the question of Canadian

membership was one of the main political reasons for the

38 The Globe and M a i l , Vancouver S u n , and the
Financial Post were the leaders in opposing the invitation
from Washington.
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Cabinet trip to Latin America.

However, it appears that

the Latin American countries saw little benefit in Canadian
participation in the O.A.S.

As an aide to Mr. Jean Luc

Pepin put it: "By and large membership seems not to matter
39
that much in most (Latin American) capitals" •

By

March of 1969, the interest generated by the Cabinet trip
had disappeared.

Even Howard Green, Minister of External

Affairs in the Diefenbaker administration, and Paul Martin,
former External Affairs Minister who have supported Canadian
membership in the O.A.S. for over twenty-five years, have
been quoted as having changed their positions, unless the
O.A.S. is reformed.

40

In short, Canadians are becoming more aware of
the O.A.S. and of Latin America in general, but are reluctant
to do more than observe.

Contacts between Canada and Latin

America have been intermittent and geared to the crisis
situations rather than to the total area
cultivation or interest.

as an object of

The Canadian Institute of

International Relations publishes the International Journal
which serves as a conveyer of those ideas which are considered
by the Institute as being of interest to its readers, many
of whom are academics and specialists and therefore, possible
opinion moulders.

39

The table below reflects the amount of

Globe and Mail

(October 30, 1968) , p . 2.

40 Paul Martin's comment in an interview with the
author at Windsor, Ontario, March 7, 1969.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49

interest in Latin America as guaged by the C.I.I.A
between 1957-67
United States of America
United Nations
Great Britain
Commonwealth
- Africa
- Asia
- West Indies
- Antipodes
Europe
Africa
Asia
Latin America

10
5
6
8
19
17
2
5
54
14
18
3

The sample above, may be indicative that Canadians at
various levels of society are still relatively unaware of
their hemispheric neighbours.

Not only is familiarity

with the region lacking, but the quantity of the material
published by Canadian specialists seems to indicate that
even as a field of academic study, Latin America is of
minor significance.
Arguments in Favour of Canadian Membership in the
Organization of American States:
Most arguments favouring Canadian involvement
in the O.A.S. advocate full membership commensurate with
Canadian strength and developmental progress within the
Western Hemisphere.As a member of the O.A.S., Ottawa
would be in a position to mediate, negotiate and stabilize
relations among the republics or between them and Washington.
Committed to the processes of quiet diplomacy, possessing
a reputation as a successful intermediary, reflecting a
history of progressive evolution, stability and anti-colonialism,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50

and harbouring no imperialistic ambitions or heritage,
Canada would be acceptable to the vast majority of
American states.

Furthermore, Canada would be welcome as

an added North American influence to de-emphasize the
cultural, economic and power rift between the U.S.A. and
the Latin American republics.

Arthur Irwin agrees that

^Canadian entry into the O.A.S. as the link between North
and South America would serve a useful purpose internationally. \
With the shift in power emphasis from Europe to Russia and
the United States, the inclusion of Canada in the O.A.S.
would present a solid, unified bloc to the U.S.S.R. and
would complete the Canadian adjustment process in accepting
the relatively new order of the world focus.

41

It is the

duty of Canada, Irwin believes, to accept her hemispheric
responsibilities in securing the North American "power
centre" by completing the hemispheric defence alliance.
Canada, through commitment to the Rio Treaty and the Charter
of the Organization of American States would, it is argued,
increase her own prestige and influence in Latin America and
the world.

At the United Nations, Canada would receive

the support of twenty-four additional votes in the General
Assembly; in the Council of N.A.T.O.; it would be consulted
regarding Latin American affairs and within the O.A.S.,
it would represent the unaligned, the objective, the rational
point of view.

Canadian-American relations would in all

41 Arthur W. Irwin, "Should Canada Join the
Organization of American States," Q u e e n 1s Quarterly, LXXII
(Summer, 1965), p.290.
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probability, be enhanced as the U.S.A. saw Ottawa accepting
her hemispheric responsibilities.

Canada and the U.S.A.

would not, as D.E. Smith suggests "cross horns to their
mutual disaffection".^2

Rather, counters Professor Irwin,

the diversity of interests among the Latin American states
would prevent such occasions arising.

Certainly, crisis

such as the Cuban situation, could be temporarily disunifying
but the O.A.S. would survive and gain, in effect, a greater
degree of realism, vitality, and objectivity as a result of
the cleavage.
A recent argument favouring Canadian membership
is concerned with the possibility of the hemispheric nations
forming a regional political alliance.

The possibilities of

Canada becoming Tlost' between two organizations such as the
O.A.S. and the Western European Union is disconcerting.

By

joining the Organization beforehand, however, Canada will
have an influence on the formation, direction, and extent
of the regional bloc.

Or, she would become the most qualified

candidate for the leadership of a Caribbean group including
Guyana, Trinidad, Tobago, Honduras, Jamaica.

In any event,

the Commonwealth ties with the West Indies bind Canada
morally, and historically to protect and aid these former
colonies - a function it could perform more effectively if
it had a vote and a voice in the councils of the Organization
of American States.

42 D.E. Smith, "Should Canada Join the Organization of
American States: A Rejoinder to W. Arthur Irwin," Q u e e n 1s
Quarterly, LXXIII, (Spring 1966), p.109.
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Possibly the strongest inducement to Canadian
membership is that its presence in the Organization as a
full member guarantees that the Canadian viewpoint will
be given and will be heard.

Had Canada been a member

when the decision to suspend Cuba was taken, her particular
stand would have been presented directly.

As Canada's

relations with the other hemispheric nations become closer,
Ottawa will be forced to take the necessary action to safeguard
these ties.

The inter-American system is the most obvious

instrument to guarantee that the Canadian opinion will be
considered.

Though John Holmes does not favour membership

in the O.A.S., he does admit the practicality of the argument
that "Canada must be present if she expects her voice to be
heard.
\There are important economic reasons why Canada
should join the inter-American system.\

The 1969 fact-finding

tour is expected to produce trade agreements with the
countries of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

At present,

Canadian trade with Latin America is nine hundred million
dollars per a n n u m , ^ about 3.5 percent of total Canadian
world trade.

With the population of Latin America expanding

at the fastest pace in the world

(approximately 3 percent),

the combined population should reach three hundred million

43 John Holmes, in an interview with the author at
Windsor, Ontario, November 25, 1968.
44

Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1967 Report.
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by 1975 providing an extensive market for potential Canadian
exports.

S.J. Randall, President of General Steel Wares Ltd.,

echoed the views of many Canadian businessmen in an article
in Monetary Times.

He said "the economic need for joining

the O.A.S." is such that Canada must act rapidly "before it
is too late and the republics merge into trading blocs."

—

\

V There

45

is a strong cultural argument for increased

Canadian involvement as has been reflected in the French!
language newspapers especially Cite Libre and Le D r o i t .
This appeal to the French-Canadians formerly centered around
membership in the O.A.S. as a counter weight to involvement
in N.A.T.O.

There is a tie, however nebulous, between the

French language and the romance Latin tongue of the hispanic
nations, although only one Latin American nation, Haiti, is
French speaking.

The argument today, however, has less

impact because of Ottawa's increased attention to Francophonic
Africa and Quebec's international forays into Gabon, Niger
and Paris.

Canada, at present, has no official cultural

exchange program with Latin America despite the rich tradition
of French, Spanish and Portuguese culture and the heritage of
the Inca, Aztec, Maya and Toltec civilizations existent in
Latin America; and notwithstanding the fact that thirty percent
of Canada is of Latin origin (French mainly).

Closer ties

with the area, it is believed, could be most easily achieved
through O.A.S. contacts.

45 S.J. Randall, editorial in Saturday N i g h t , LXX V I .
(August 5, 1961).
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IBy joining the Organization, Ottawa would
automatically increase its role in alllspheres; cultural,
economic and political.! The moral obligation Canada has,
to assist the poorer nations of the world, should be met
here in Latin America in her own hemisphere.

The Latin

American peoples are linked to Canadians and have been
neglected too long.

The dominant member of the O.A.S. has

urged Canadian membership, the body has unanimously endorsed
the invitation, and the benefits, it is argued, are obvious
and far outweigh the costs of such a move.

Writing in 194 2,

John Humphrey believed he had gauged the attitude of the
Canadian people accurately when he wrote;
Canadians are much surer of themselves than
they were twenty years ago, and they look
to the future....They feel, moreover, that
because of their particular relationship to
two Great Old World cultures, they have a
role to play in the hemisphere which fully
justifies their continued national independence.
Membership in the Pan American Organization
will make that role easier to play.^6
Twenty-five years later, Arthur Irwin again interpreted
the Canadian mentality regarding Latin America.

He said;

...more than forty years of observation of
public affairs in this country impels me to
the conviction that if lead were given...
the Canadian people would respond positively
as they have responded to similar challenges in
the past.

46

John Humphrey, o p .c i t ., p. 281.

47

Arthur W. Irvin, op.cit., p.303.
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As noted in the introduction, many Canadian
statesmen believe Canada has a role to play within the
O.A.S. and in Latin America,

iprime Minister Trudeau agreed

with those who support membership; he said,
As soon as we learn our role, which I hope
will be soon, we must get into the O.A.S.
to exercise that role.^°
Canada is in Latin America at present, in the persons of
missionaries, educators, doctors, social workers, technocrats
and C.U.S.O. volunteers.

It remains for Ottawa to give

concrete expression to the potential and present CanadianLatin American harmony through membership in the Organization
of American States.

48

P.E. Trudeau, o p .c i t ., p.l
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I I I

ARGUMENTS AGAINST CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP

Arguments on either side of the membership issue
have remained relatively constant over the last six decades.
Canadian attention to Latin America has been intermittent
and restricted to the Caribbean; specifically the West Indies.
An important qualification made by those who oppose Canadian
participation in the Organization of American States, is
that they do not oppose increased involvement on a bilateral
basis with Latin American states.

John Harbron, Ian MacDonald,

Ian Lumsden, John Holmes and others opposing membership do so,
primarily on the grounds that the benefits would be negligible
in view of the restrictions and responsibilities incurred.
Many Canadians agree that the country is uninformed regarding
Latin America and that Canada "must have a policy of its
own...and learn to exercise it"^® before joining the O.A.S.
The contention of those who oppose immediate involvement is
that Canada has higher priorities at present and little reason
to designate Latin America as an area of rapid economic and
political cultivation.
The historic obstacles to involvement are still
present to varying degrees, iFor example, Canada is heavily
committed to numerous international organizations at present,

49

P.E. Trudeau, op.cit., p.l.
56
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and the argument that Ottawa is incapable of assuming
additional responsibilities now does have some validity
even today.\

In addition, there is still a serious lack of

trained experts in the area of Latin America, the cost of
joining the O.A.S., estimated at over thirty-one million, 50
is prohibitive and should be allotted to repressed, aidreceiving countries, and as Holmes says, Canada must be
selective and "avoid...the attempt to do all things with
the result that we may do nothing well, and the urge to
be all things to all men.

51

fThe most familiar historical argument against
membership is that Canada would find itself forced to take
sides, thus risking alienation of either the Latin American
countries as a whole, a particular faction of them (such as
Mexico, Brazil and Chile which are the most progressive and
often vote against Washington on serious questions regarding
intervention) or Washington itself.')

It is argued that if

Canada and the U.S.A. are to quarrel, the issue must be one
of serious national interest.") The prospect of Ottawa being
forced to assume a position counter to United States interest

50 John Harbron, op.cit., p. 27. Harbron estimates
membership would cost Canada one million dollars initially,
thirty million to fulfill its probably Inter-American
Development Bank assessment, plus supporting costs and
contributions to the Alliance for Progress.
51 John W. Holmes, "Our Other Hemisphere: Reflections
on the Bahia Conference," International Journal, (Autumn, 1962)
p .415.
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over a border dispute between two South American republics,
is frightening, given the fact that a major Canadian foreign
policy goal is the maintenance of a cooperative harmony
with its greatest ally and neighbour.

The Canadian-American

relationship is both unique and profitable; if it is to be
jeopardized the conflict must be of vital interest to both
states.
The Commonwealth ties with the Caribbean countries
could conceivably provide Ottawa with a ready-made bloc of
which it would be the spokesman.

This contention is used by

supporters of Canadian membership as being a necessary step
to increase Canadian prestige and influence around the world.
Perhaps, they argue, Canada would become the counterweight
to United States hegemony in the area,thus saving Ottawa the
embarrassment of being placed between the Latin American
and the U.S. interests.

Unfortunately, experience has shown

that the Latin American republics distrust blocs, believing
they are divisive.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that Canadian-

Caribbean interests and priorities would coincide given their
divergent degrees of development. 5 2

In support of this

counter view, John Holmes points out that experience in the
United Nations has demonstrated that;
Canadians - a pragmatic and inarticulate
people - are intolerant of the incurably
rhetorical Latins: The more committees we
sit in the less well we work together.53

52

Charles Lynch, Ottawa Citizen, August 9, 1966.

53

Holmes, o p .c i t ., p.417.
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The possible economic effects of Canadian
membership in the Organization warrant consideration here.
Canadian economic involvement in Latin America has been
confined to the Caribbean principally and Brazil.

Coopera

tion is based on personal business contacts and government
trade commissions and while it is possible that membership in
the O.A.S. would add new dimensions to Canadian commercialism
in Latin America, it is doubtful that the Canadian businessman
would appreciate the political subtleties included.

John

Harbron points out that a meeting of Canadian executives
involved in Latin America, sponsored by the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs, was split on the question of
O.A.S. membership.

Those who opposed Canadian membership

did so on the grounds that government trade commissions were
objective and entirely adequate.

Those who favoured the

idea thought participation in the O.A.S., or any regional
agency, would broaden contacts and increase liaison with
all the Latin American countries.

54

It is interesting to

note that the more progressive Latin American countries,
place a minimal value on the O.A.S. as a commercial or contaet
agency.

Otto Lang, Acting Minister of Mines and Northern

Resources, for example, has said that he was convinced the
nations he visited in 1969

(Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Columbia)

viewed the O.A.S. as an "artificial body devoted mainly to
the discussion of common political and developmental problems".

54

Harbron, op.cit. p. 26.

55 Otto Lang, in an interview with the author in
Winnipeg, January 23, 1969.
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The argument that Canadian membership in the
O.A.S. would guarantee that country inclusion in the Latin
American Free Trade Area

(LAFTA) is a weak one also.

The

United States, Latin America's greatest trading partner,
has no intention of joining such an organization, so it is
difficult to see how Canada would benefit by doing s o . ^

If

LAFTA were to offer O.A.S. members preferential tariffs in
a world market system, the appeal to Canadian investors
would be greater, but here again, this is impossible in
light of the dependence of most countries in Latin America
on one-crop economies and the exclusion of Canada's greatest
trading partner.
Additional economic obstacles to greater Canadian
involvement in Latin America are of a similar difficulty to
overcome.

In May of 1967, prior to the Geneva Agreement on

Trade and Tariffs meeting

(Kennedy Round), Mitchell Sharp

outlined the principles which would guide Canadian external
economic policy.

Foremost was the reciprocity arrangements

which are essential to Canadian export growth.
words,

In Mr. Sharp's

"there must be a reasonable balance between concessions

obtained and those which we

(Canada) grant."

57

It would be

impossible for the Latin American countries to compete with
the Commonwealth preferential trade agreements.

56

In addition,

Smith, op.cit., p.107.

57 Mitchell Sharp, Address to Canadian Manufacturer's
Association Annual Meeting, May 29, 1967. p . 2.
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Mr. Sharp pointed out that Ottawa's main objective was to
increase its "traditional exports of raw materials and foodstuffs."

58

Latin America would purchase little in the

realm of primary exports at this stage in its development
when the emphasis is on industrialization

and the maximization

of efficiency through the importation of manufacturing
equipment and technological advancements.
The question of Canadian public opinion regarding
O.A.S. membership is another directive that will guide the
Canadian Government's actions in Latin America.

Paul Martin,

former Minister of External Affairs, has been an outspoken
and long-term advocate of O.A.S. membership for Canada.
Indeed, if the question had been considered a major policy
issue, Mr. Martin would have been compelled to resign his
Cabinet position years ago.

As it stands at present,

however, public opinion has been incalculable.

The government

did urge the public to express itself in 1961, but the
response was too poor to even be considered noteworthy.

A

report prepared by J.C.M. Ogelsby in 1967, points out that
the majority of letters received in April of 1961, were
opposed to membership. 5 9

Mr. Martin believes that Canada

has a duty to join the O.A.S. as a member of the Western
Hemisphere but is reluctant to introduce such a motion to
the Government until public opinion indicates support for

58

Sharp, op.cit. p. 2.

59 J.C.M. Ogelsby, Report prepared for the Department
of External Affairs, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1967). p. 27.
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such a move.®®

It appears even to Mr. Martin that;

the general Canadian opinion, however, does
not seem to support the view that we (Canada)
should join the Organization of American States. 1
As noted earlier, successive Canadian governments have
relied on public opinion to guide their perspective toward
the Organization of American States.

The role of the public

in foreign affairs, while usually minimal in any country,
has either become crucial in this sphere of Canadian-O.A.S.
potential for some unknown reason, or is being used as a
convenient excuse for indecision.

Possibly, the question of

O.A.S. membership has been of minor importance to the
Canadian government over the years, and has necessitated the
seeking of a crutch to answer the few who persist in raising
the question?
A possible though partial explanation for the
Canadian citizens' indifference is a recent awareness that
they are not members of any so-called Western Hemisphere.
As Holmes points out, the idea of a Western Hemisphere is a
c2
figment of the geographer's imagination.
Traditionally,
Canadians have been intimately linked to the North Atlantic
group of states.

The idea that hemispheric unity demands

formal Canadian adherence to an O.A.S. Charter, has been
discarded by most Canadian academics as being unrealistic

6Q Minutes # 9 , External Affairs Committee, Thursday
June 16, 1966. Statement by Hon. Paul Martin.
61

Charles Lynch, Ottawa Citizen, August 9,1966. p. 6.

62 John Holmes in an interview with the author,
November 26, 1968.
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and artificial.
To the extent that Canada should be involved
in foreign relations... the problems must be
viewed in their global context.63
Canadians have become universalist in their conception of
foreign relations as demonstrated in Ottawa's relationship
with Cuba, the Chinese Peoples' Republic, its position
during the United Nation membership crisis of 1955, its
commitment to the United Nations and its multinational and
political trading outlook.

To many Canadians, the Pan

American system must appear more as a United States-Latin
American historical evolution than a collective security
organization to which Canada need belong.
It is axiomatic that the foreign policy of
a country is an expression of what it
conceives to be in its national interest.64
The question here is whether the Organization
of American States would serve Canada's interests more
efficiently than continued adherence to the present policy of
bilateral contacts?

Or, conversely, would the O.A.S. impair

Canadian efforts to expand her role in Latin America?
Membership in the Organization would add little
to the extension of Canadian interests in Latin America.
Canadian officials in all spheres maintain contact with their

63 Ian Macdonald, "Canada in Two Hemispheres",
Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXIII, No.6. July, 1964. p.l.
64 Paul Martin, "Aspects of Canada and United States
Foreign Policies", Address given at East Lansing, Michigan,
February 25, 1967. p.l.
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counterparts in the Latin nations through diplomatic
missions, trade commissions, international organs; such
as, United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America
(UNECLA), World Health Organization

(WHO), United Nations

Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and
Pan American institutions such as the Inter-American
Statistical Institute

(IASI), Inter-American Radio Office

(IARO), Pan American Institute of Geography and History
(PAIGH).

In addition, there is constant cooperation in

the fields of labour, technology, education, social welfare,
urban problems and so on.

Canadians work as teachers,

missionaries, social workers and CUSO volunteers in all the
Latin American nations.

In 1964, a new dimension, foreign

aid, was added to the extent of $152.2 million through the
Export Credits Insurance Act.

(Section 21A).

/similarly, Canadian contacts on a bilateral basis
have been very successful as demonstrated by the Cabinet
trip headed by Mr. Sharp in October of 1968.

The Canadian

officials were especially successful in the negotiation
of trade and cultural agreements between Canada and Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala . )

65 Paul Martin, "Some reflections on the Principles
Underlying Canadian Foreign Policy", Address given at
Waterloo University, (May 22, 1967), p.4.
66 External Affairs Monthly Report, January, 1969.
(Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs), p.127.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65

Although the question of O.A.S. membership was not included
in Mr. Sharp's report to the House, he did say that the
matter was "still in balance."
When the mission left for the Latin American
tour on October 27, 1968, Mr. Sharp was quoted as saying;
the most important aspect of the mission
concerns Canadian political relationships
with Latin America including Canada's
relationship with the O.A.S.67
Mr. Sharp was openly disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm
displayed by the Latin American governments regarding Canadian
membership in the O.A.S.

The Cabinet Mission's report could

well be a significant directive to Ottawa to postpone the
membership question for yet another four years.
In an interview with a Globe and Mail Reporter,
Mexico's Director of Tourism, Agustine Salvat, commented on
the Cabinet mission, he said;
I got no hint about Canada's political
thinking towards Latin America.
If this
trip was in preparation for a membership
^g
bid, I bet few Latins got to know about it.
Despite the fact that Mr. Sharp had stated before leaving
the "most important aspect" of the mission was to discuss
political relationships, he is quoted in the same article
after the trip as saying;
Canadian membership was not really important
to Latin American countries anyway.
They

67 Mitchell Sharp as quoted in the Globe and M a i l ,
October 25, 1968. p.l.
68

Betty Lee, Globe and M a i l , December 24, 1968. p. 7.
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want closer relations but would not take
offense if this was not done through the
O.A.S.69
Otto Lang a member of the Canadian fact-finding mission,
believes the majority of the Canadian Cabinet agrees with
the Mexican External Affairs Minister, Antonio C a n l l o Flores,

70

who said he could agree with and defend the argument that
Canadians should develop their own relations with Latin
America outside the O . A . S . ^

Whatever the outcome of the

foreign affairs review regarding Latin America, it is certain
that the January Latin American excursion will be significant
in that the trip eliminated the illusions of many Canadian
statesmen who envisioned the republics as hosts anxious for
the important guest to arrive.
It is not difficult to comprehend the lack of
enthusiasm of the Latin nations toward Canadian membership.
In spite of superficial appearances to the contrary, the
Alliance is not a homogenous one.

There are striking economic,

political and ethnic differences between the Latin American
countries themselves as well as the obvious discrepancies
between them and the United States.

For example, it is

difficult, if not impossible, to discover the common denominator
between the Creole-speaking Negroes that comprise ninety
percent of Haiti and the Spanish of Costa Rica.

The former

has a one-crop economy based on coffee; the latter relies on

69

Ibid.

70

Interview with author, Winnipeg, January 1969.

71

Lee, o p .c i t . p.7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
cacao, coffee and bananas.

The political structures are

antagonistic; the former an entrenched dictatorship; the
latter a stable democracy.
Internally, few Canadians realize the persistent
instability of the vast majority of the Latin American
republics.

All except Chile, Mexico and Uruguay have suffered

cit least one illegal change of government since

1948.^2

Externally, the picture is again, one of instability and
antagonism.

Border clashes and ideological conflicts are

traditions, guerilla warfare is prospering and the majority
have suffered continual outside interference both from
Washington and their neighbours.

The historic result is that

each nation is highly sensitive, possessing different ideas
of what role the O.A.S. should play.

For example, Mexico

and the larger republics see the Organization as primarily a
collective security arrangement, while the U.S.A. and the
smaller nations,

(dependent on Washington to a great extent)

see the O.A.S. as the guarantor of democracy.

73

If one

adds to this list of inconsistencies the open split between
the most progressive Latin republics and the United States,
it becomes easier to understand the fears of many Canadian
Members of Parliament who applauded Stanley Knowles when he
said in the House that he hoped

72

Slater, b p .c i t ., p . 276.
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Ibid. p.271.
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the Canadian government will continue to
be sceptical about accepting the full
implications of membership, (and) Parliament
should have the opportunity to discuss (this)
before we have been taken down the path to
a situation that might involve us in defence,
monetary and trade relations that would make
us more a satellite than we are now of the
main power in the Organization of American
States.74
Having outlined the arguments for and against
Canadian participation in the O.A.S., it would be appropriate
here to discuss the possible effect of membership on the
Canadian position in two crisis situations involving Cuba
in 1962 and the Dominican Republic in 1965.

In addition to

discussing the relative positions taken by the O.A.S. and
Canada on the two instances, an attempt is made to discern
the probable effect of Canadian membership on Ottawa's eventual
stand.
The Cuban Crisis:
The Canadian position vis-a-vis the Cuban crisis
in 1962 differed from that of the O.A.S., not on basic
principles but on tactics.

Whereas both the O.A.S. and

Canada took the position that Soviet short and middle range
missiles in Cuba represented a serious offensive threat to
the Western Hemisphere, Ottawa believed restraint and caution
would be more effective in preventing an international
confrontation.

Had Canada been a member of the O.A.S. the

pressure on the government to agree with the O.A.S. action

74

Debates, November 29, 1968.
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in supporting the U.S. trade embargo and Severing diplomatic:
ties with Havana would not have been much greater than was
the pressure imposed by the Kennedy forces.

However, the

element of time was an important factor in the eventual
Canadian position.

tr^

Diefenbaker, though informed nineteen

hour$ before John F. Kennedy's public announcement of the
blockade at noon, Monday, October 22, did not announce support
of the United States quarantine until Thursday, October 25.
Had Canada been a participant in the Organization of American
States' discussions begun at 8:00 a.m. Tuesday, October 23,
it would have been placed in the unavoidable position of
commitment or abstention.

The motion endorsing Washington's

action passed in the Organization of American States by a
vote of nineteen to nothing.
Diefenbaker's fear of being viewed as the obedient
follower of the United States was one of the major factors
in his refusal to grant automatic public support to the
Kennedy proposal,
One of the least effective ways of persuading
Canada to adopt a policy is for the President
of another country to...tell us what we should
d o .^ 5
Although enunciated in response to an offer by Kennedy to
join the O.A.S., the sentiment has remained the same well
into the nineteen sixties and was especially keen during the
Cuban affair.

75

Debates, Vol. I, 1960-1, pp.700-1.
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The eventual Canadian position regarding the
missile crisis was definitely in sympathy with the O.A.S.
membership, but did not go as far as confirmation of the
United States embargo.

The Canadian attitude toward trade

restrictions on Cuba and diplomatic relations with the
Castro regime had been formulated in October 1960, and has
never changed even after the missile crisis
change of government

(1963).

(1962) and

Had Canada been in the O.A.S.

during the missile crisis, its position today would have
been outwardly the same as that of the United States.

Even

Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia, which opposed U.S. moves to
isolate Cuba in 1960 and again in 1962, felt compelled to
support Washington in October of 1962.

The motion outlined

below passed the O.A.S. Organization of Consultation Meeting
the day after Kennedy's embargo announcement.

In summary,

1.

If found by "...in controvertible evidence..."
that "...Cuba...has secretly endangered the
peace of the continent by permitting the
establishment of intermediate and middle
range missiles on its territory by the SinoSoviet powers...."

2.

It called "...for the immediate dismantling
and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and
other weapons with offensive capability."

3.

It recommended "...that the member states,
in accordance with Article six and eight of
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprical
Assistance, take all measures...which they
may deem necessary... to prevent the missiles
in Cuba...from ever becoming an active threat
to the peace and security of the continent...."76

76

New York Times, October 24, 1962. p . 22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

Canada would have been legally compelled to support the
resolution.

The proof of Soviet missile bases in Cuba was

well documented, and as a signatory to the Rio Treaty,
Ottawa1s only alternative to supporting the motion would
have been to abstain in which case it was bound under
Article nineteen of the Rio Treaty, which becomes operative
if two-thirds of the members support a resolution.
The divergence of views in Ottawa and Washington,
was primarily the result of the difference in attitudes toward
Latin America.

Neither the missile threat nor the necessity

of joining in the quarantine were considered in Ottawa as
requiring Canadian involvement.

To be sure,the threat was

real to most Canadians, but they viewed the crisis solution
as being in the hands of the "Great Powers".

Thus the

Canadian government withheld announcement of public support
for the embargo; delayed the placing of Canadian NORAD forces
on the alert and urged "free men everywhere" to remain calm
and not to "panic". 7 7

While ascertaining its own official

position on the crisis in private, one fact was made clear
to the public; Canada did support the U.S.A. position regarding
point two of the Punta del Este resolution which demanded the
dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The question centred around how far Canada would support the
follow-up quarantine of Cuba.

The personal relationship

between the President and the Prime Minister and the ever present

77 Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crisis, Toronto:
C.I.I.A., (December, 1968T^ p .206.
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Canadian fear of satillitism, both profound influences

on

Diefenbaker, prevented immediate Canadian acceptance of the
United States' position.

Having been informed, not consulted,

only hours before the announcement of the embargo, the
Government resented United States expectations of immediate
and full public support.

Senator

Charles Foulkes, former

Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff during NORAD negotations,
elucidated the Canadian position with respect to hemispheric
crisis, and Canadian-American cooperation to defend against
them.

He said,
Canada has to be consulted every time the
U.S. contemplates using force anywhere in
the world.

Since Canada was not, in Diefenbaker's opinion, consulted but
informed, and then only hours before public announcement of
United States action, Canada could not have been expected to
regard the missile problem as a serious threat to itself
but rather as a potential one, if U.S. counteraction failed.
In any event, the Canadian reaction to Washington's unilateral
declaration, though confused and delayed, was an independent
one arrived at after profound and extensive discussion at
all levels.

Diefenbaker's position, right or wrong, was an

independent position that would not have been open to a
member of the Organization of American States.
The Dominican Crisis:
The Dominican crisis in 1965 presented another

78

Reford, op.cit. p. 209.
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situation similar to the Cuban missile crisis in which the
Canadian position differed from that of the United States
and the Organization of American States.
The intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican
Republic in April of 1965 was

'legitimized' by the O.A.S.

on May 6 at the Tenth Reunion of the Foreign Ministers of
the Organization.

By a vote of fourteen to five, the U.S.A.

succeeded in getting the minimum necessary support for the
creation of the first O.A.S.

military peacekeeping force

known as the Fuerza Inter-Americana de la Paz

(FIP.)

The

landing of thirty thousand marines to protect foreign
nationals in Santo Domingo was also justified under the guise
that there was a serious threat of a communist takeover of
the reins of government.

In support of this premise, the

CIA produced a list of fifty-three suspected communist
sympathizers,

79

hardly sufficient justification for the

breaking of the O.A.S. Charter, which prohibits intervention
in the internal affairs of a member state.
The reaction of Canadian news media to the U.S.
intervention centred on criticism of the unilateral nature
of the action and most hoped that the O.A.S. would bring order
out of chaos.

In Parliament, Prime Minister Pearson and

External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, expressed the same
fears and hopes.

While Mr. Martin "gratefully acknowledged"

7 9 Ian Schlanders, Backwater War that Could Shake
the Whole World, MacLeans Magazine, Vol. LXXVIII, July 24, 1965.
p .20.
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the protection provided Canadian citizens by the United States
marines, noted that the Canadian government disagreed with
the unilateral aspect of Washington's intervention.

80

The

Canadian spokesmen were hesitant on the question of U.S.
intervention for over a month after the April 24th revolution
broke out.

Aware of the seriousness of the situation in

which Washington found herself, both in the O.A.S. and the
U. N . , Ottawa was reluctant to add its critical voice to the
rest of the world.

Until May 28, the government refused to

answer directly, questions concerning the Dominican Republic,
and then only after repeated insistence on the part of the
Opposition.
Had Canada been a member of the O.A.S. her position
would have clearly been a critical one.

The United States

resolution at the Foreign Ministers Conference required a
two-thirds majority if Washington was to receive O.A.S.
endorsement.

The Canadian Foreign Minister would have held

the decisive vote in a very clear cut situation.

Would Canada

have voted for her ally despite the obvious objections to
U.S. action among the Canadian public and press?

The choice

for Canada would have been especially troublesome because an
abstention on the vote would have had the effect of opposing
the resolution.

The vote fourteen-five-nothing, a bare two-

thirds majority, would have become fourteen-five-one in which

80 Debates, May 28, 1965. p.1776. Statement by
Paul Martin.
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case the resolution would have failed.
It is possible to speculate that Canada would not
have voted for the resolution.

The Progressive Conservatives

and the New Democrats, in addition to the press, declared
the United States'action "illegal" and a violation of interp1

national law.OJ-

In supporting Washington, the Canadian

government would have been in opposition to what were then
some of the most progressive republics in Latin America,

p2

and sanctioned the actions not only of the United States
marines but also of the other nations that contributed troops
to the F.I.D., that is, the dictatorships of Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Brazil.
Despite the possible outcome, the fact remains
that Canadian action would have been criticized in any event.
In supporting the Americans,perhaps Ottawa would have received
a number of diplomatic credits from Washington.

Perhaps,

as John Holmes believes;
Canadians did not like the way the United
States handled the Dominican affair.
The
rest thanked God we did not have to make
any decisions our s e l v e s . ^
Canadian policy makers would be wise to consider seriously
the benefits of their country's present status vis-a-vis
the O.A.S. and the United States.

Free to follow her own

81

Debates, May 21, 1965. p.1560 and May 25, 1965. p. 1608.
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Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.
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John W. Holmes, Canada and Pan America, p.181.
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independent foreign policy, unhampered by the necessity of
assuming a rigid position, Ottawa can better negotiate the
dips and swells of her relationship with Washington.
Both the Cuban and the Dominican Republic affairs
demonstrate the possible restrictions membership in the O.A.S.
could place on Canadian foreign policy.

As a member of the

Organization of American States, Ottawa's traditional loyalties
to Washington and the Commonwealth would be compromised.
Dedicated to the principles of sovereignity and the fostering
of a stronger United Nations, Canadian membership in the
Organization would prove incompatible because of United States
domination and use of the O.A.S. to cloak its own unilateral
actions.

Jerome Slater, in a paper entitled, The Limits of

Letigimization in International Organizations: The O.A.S. and
the Dominican crisis, came to the following conclusion:
The Dominican experience is apparently viewed
by the majority of O.A.S. states as more of a
warning than a precedent, and it is probable
that the role of the Organization in inter and
intra state political conflict has entered a
decline.
The attitude of the Chileans, Mexicans
and Uruguayans - we may have to live with U.S.
domination of the hemisphere but we don't have to
institutionalize and legitimate it by giving the
O.A.S. political authority - may now be becoming
the prevailing o n e . 84

84 Jerome Slater, The Limits of Legitimization in
International Organizations: The O.A.S. and the Dominican
Crisis (New York: 1968).
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CHAPTER IV

ANTICIPATED CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The dominating question in Canadian-Latin American
relations concerns membership in the Organization of
American States.

Indeed, many Canadians view political Latin

America as synonymous with the Organization of American States,
and increased involvement with the former means, to many,
membership in the latter.®^

As discussed above, proponents

of membership see the O.A.S. as a hemispheric responsibility,
a Canadian duty, a necessary contribution to the development
of Latin America, and a counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the
area.

Opponents believe Canada is overburdened with inter

national commitments to the United Nations, N.A.T.O., the
Commonwealth and most recently to la Francophonie, and therefore,
could not assume additional responsibilities at this time.
They envision Canada as being caught in the middle of any
United States-Latin American confrontation, as having too
much to lose and too little to gain.
This section outlines Canadian views on Latin
America and attempts to fit increased involvement in Latin
America into the overall spectrum of anticipated Canadian
foreign policy.

It is hoped that this discussion will

provide additional insight into the arguments concerning

85

Ogelsby, op.cit. p . 18.
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membership.
Canada and Latin America - A Projection on Future Relations:
To what extent Canada should be involved in any
particular area of the world is a question which must be
answered in its global context.

As the largest of the small

powers, Canada's position and influence was much different
in 1945 than it is today.

Immediately after World War II,

Canada was the fourth strongest power in the world militarily,
the fifth largest exporter, one of the few countries untouched
by the war, and the leader of the middle and small powers.
Today, the world is much larger with twice the number of
independent states; the Canadian export economy, though still
strong, is now seventh in the world; the million men under
arms in 1945 has been reduced to one-tenth of its former size,
and the balance of power has become a "balance of terror"
dominated by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

Europe has been

revitalized and the third world has been born.
Trudeau has written,

As Prime Minister

"realism in how we read the world barometer

...in how we see ourselves thriving in the climate it forecasts
must be the prime directive of Canadian foreign policy.
Professor B.E. Burton has succinctly outlined the
basic determinants of Canadian external p o l i c y ^ as being: the
presence of the U.S.A., the bicultural nature of the country,
the Canadian style of mediation, and the Canadian capability.

86

Statement by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, May 29, 1968, p. 2.

87 Bruce E. Burton, "Canada's Position in the World,"
The World and the School No. 14, (October, 1968), pp.19-27.
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Little elaboration,if any, is needed concerning the limitations
that its giant neighbour to the south places on Canada.

For

obvious reasons Ottawa is forced to consider her special
relationship with the world's larged: power as being of prime
importance.

In addition, the Canadian style of "quiet

diplomacy" and peaceful negotiation has been so successful that
it is doubtful that Messrs. Sharp and Trudeau desire to trade
it in for a louder but perhaps less effective approach.

As

Mr. Burton points out;
Consensus building, mediating interpreting,
keeping the talks going, and holding things
together come naturally to the central political
elites of a federal state characterized by a
relatively small, bilingual, polycultural,
polyethnic population sprawled over a vast
extent of territory and over several regions.
To study the projected direction and scope of Canada's
foreign policy in the near future the two most important
variables are her biculturalism and her national capabilities.
Is Canada in a position to contribute significantly to the
positive development of the O.A.S.7

Indeed, is it in her

interests to do so at this time, given the historical and
cultural priorities on her external aid, the goals of her
foreign policy, and the domestic contingencies with which she
must contend?
In the last fifteen years Canadian biculturalism
has emerged,demanding recognition.

Though it is impossible to

fashion an external policy based on the total Canadian ethnic

88

Ibid. p .26 .
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mosaic, the two official cultures are now being reflected
in Canadian policy directives.

According to the 1961 census

approximately 43.8 percent of Canadians are of British origin
and 30.4 percent of French stock.

Prime Minister Trudeau,

and those who elected him in June of 1968, believe Canadian
foreign policy must reflect the realities of the nation's
new found "dual nationality".

And so, the quiet revolution

within the East Block in Ottawa has created a new "Relations
among French-Speaking States Division", has placed a new
emphasis on la Francophonie, has accelerated the Canadian
aid program and has encouraged the Prime Minister to declare
that Canada's major foreign policy goal is;
to ensure the political survival of Canada
as a federal and bilingual sovereign state....
It means reflecting in our foreign relations
the cultural diversity and bilingualism of
Canada as faithfully as p o s s i b l e . 8 9
The selection of a dynamic foreign policy based on
Prime Minister Trudeau's model, acceptable to both French and
English Canadians, and contributive to the nation's political
unity at home must, of course, involve a significant increase
in attention and aid to French-speaking countries.

In the

last four to five years, Canadian officials in the Department
of External Affairs have followed this popular directive in
the political, economic and cultural spheres of foreign policy.
Francophone Africa has been the prime target for
Canadian government investment in all three areas.

89

Trudeau, op.cit., p. 6.
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area of foreign aid, Canada has increased its total aid
program from an average annual amount of three hundred
thousand dollars to $22.1 million in 1969.

These figures

not only represent a huge percentage increase in terms of
aid to Francophone Africa, but also take on an added
significance when seen in comparison to the total aid allotted
to Latin America over the last four years.

Aid to the Latin

American republics has averaged only $5.57 million per annum'
and has remained static for that

period.

^

This increase in

aid to Africa is indicative of two facts; the capability of
the country to support an enlarged aid program has risen and
the orientation for this increase will be principally Frenchspeaking Africa,

Mr. Trudeau has confirmed this second fact.

He has said, that"Canada must allot a "substantially increased
share of our

(Canada's) aid...to Francophone countries as

an important investment both in improving bilateral relations
and in contributing to national unity."

91

Lack of cohesion

at home is the most serious problem facing Canadians at
present, and is likely to remain so in the immediate future.
With this fact in mind, it is important that the Canadian
government discern an international role for Canada which has
a cementing influence at home.

In the realm of foreign

policy, Africa has been chosen as the principal field for
Ottawa's cultivation.

French-speaking Africa is the best

proving ground for Canada's new bilingual, bicultural foreign

90
Printer,
91

Canadian International Development Agen c y , Queen's
(Ottawa: 1967-8), p . 9.
Trudeau, op.cit. p.6.
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aid program.

To achieve maximum impact, Canada is obliged

to select relatively few areas of the globe for her particular
attention.

As Ian Macdonald writes;

We must avoid ... the attempt to do all
things with the result that we may do
nothing w e l l . 9 2
At the same time, Canada cannot abandon her commitments to
the Commonwealth members; therefore, contemporary obligations
will be continued at their present pace and the increase will
be granted to the twenty nations of Francophone Africa.
While Latin America has also received additional
funds for development through Canadian contributions, to the
Inter-American Development-Bank

(IADB),the ties of history

outside the Caribbean, are non-existent and the obligation
less urgent, less compelling.

John Holmes raises the pertinent

question here;
Is there anything special about South America
which makes an association with it more
natural than with Japan or Europe, or Australia,
or India?93
Ideally, all countries of the globe are legitimate objects
of any state's attention, but for Ottawa, the "urge to be all
94
things to all men" must, as mentioned, be suppressed by
reality.

Aid to French-speaking Africa has run four hundred

percent higher than to Latin America in 1968-1969 95 and Canada
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Macdonald, op.cit., p . 4.

93

John W. Holmes,

94

Macdonald, op.cit. p.4.

"Reflections on the Bohia Conference"

p .415.

95 Department of External Affairs, Monthly Bulletin,
Vol. XX. No. 11, November, 1968, p . 474.
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has made its choice, if dollars are any indicator of preference
or d i r e c tion.^
In addition to linguistic similarity, Africa offers
Canada a place to establish her presence.

Unlike the Western

Hemisphere where United States hegemony is obvious and
restricting, French-speaking Africa is free of United States
domination.

The competition is less avid and the opportunities

are correspondingly much greater in the dark continent.

It

is difficult to visualize any substantial alteration in the
new Canadian commitment to Africa, and it is impossible for
Ottawa to concentrate on a third area of the globe at present
or in the immediate future.
Canada's limited capabilities to exert influence
in the Western Hemisphere are an axiom of her foreign policy.
The American presence in South and Central America is such
that Canada would be the "weak sister" in any regional
organization such as the Organization of American States.
For example, the Canadian foreign aid allotment to the entire
world is only one-eighth of that contributed by Washington
to Latin America alone.

The Canadian financial allotment on

a bilateral basis has remained stable at ten million dollars
to the I.A.D.B. since 1964 and the projection is the same
for 1970.

As long as this token gesture is the total Canadian

96 Report of the Canadian Ministerial Mission to Latin
America, October T T , 1968, Queen's Printer, (Ottawa: 1968),
Canadian development assistance to Latin America is only
three percent of her total world program of economic
development, p.11.
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contribution to Latin America

(excluding the Caribbean),

the bulk of Latin America will continue to remain a secondary
bloc of nations in the realm of Canadian external policy.
In a second area for comparison of the Canadian
attitude toward Francophone Africa and Latin America, that
of cultural inter-action, the evidence is even more revealing,
The table below demonstrates the rapid awareness in Ottawa
of the benefits of pursuing a bilingual approach in the
realm of cultural interchange.
CANADA - FRANCOPHONE AFRICA CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM 97
Number of Participants
1964
1967

1
83
26

98
330
310

Category

Percent Increase
9800
400
1200

Advisors
Teachers
Students

The table portrays a program that is still in the embryonic
stage.

However, the progress being made in terms of the

number of participants

indicates a definite bid on the

Canadian government's part to extend the cultural exchange
program to every French-speaking African nation.

By contrast,

Ottawa, which has had economic ties with Latin America for
one hundred years, and diplomatic representation for thirtyfive years, has not yet made the effort to establish an
official cultural exchange program with the republics of

97 Canadian International Development Agency,
Annual Review (Ottawa: 1968), p. 20.
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Central and South America.
In a third sphere, that of diplomacy and official
exchange of missions, Francophone Africa has again been the
major goal of Canadian expansion.

In Latin America there has

not been an addition to the fourteen resident Canadian missions,
including those in the Caribbean, since 1963.

Those missions

already present in Latin America are, in addition, being
maintained at minimal

s

t

a

n

d

a

r

d

s

.

By comparison, Canada

has added five resident missions in French-speaking Africa in
1969 making a total of twelve established in twelve years.
In this indicative area of official relations between govern
ments, the trend again is toward a maintenance of-present quotas
in Latin America and the fostering of increased contacts with
French-speaking Africa.
The fourth element of Canada's external relationships
is economic.

Canadian economic survival as the world's fifth

largest trading nation depends on the continual securing of
new markets for Canadian exports.

In this all-important search,

Latin America's projected population of four hundred million
by 1972, should be very attractive to Canadian investors.
It is interesting to note that Colo.mbia has the oldest trading
agreement with Canada; drawn up in 1866, the contract is still
in e f f e c t . D e s p i t e

the long-term commercial relationship

between Canada and Latin America, and the fact that CanadianLatin American trade has surpassed the one billion dollar level,

98

Mission to Latin America, op.cit., p. 36.

99 J.H. Warren, address given in Montreal, Tuesday,
February 7, 1967, p.2.
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Latin America is still heavily dependent on the United States's
market and on concessions from the State Department in
Washington.

It is significant that in one hundred and two

years of trading, no more than 5 percent of total Canadian exports
have ever gone south of the U.S.
The future commerical development of Latin America,
while it looks promising considering the creation of several
regional trade organs such as the Central American Common
Market

(CACM), and the Latin American Free Trade Area

is also misleading.

(LAFTA)

Canadian export markets are uncommonly

a'1 political in contrast to the politically restricted markets
of the U.S.A., the U..S.S.R., Japan, West Germany and so on.
Because they trade in all areas of the world, including Cuba
and the two Chinas, Canadians are more responsive to all
potential markets.

With this fact in mind, it seems quite

evident that Canadian exporters are looking to Japan to
absorb an ever increasing percentage of Canada's exports.

The

rapid growth of Japanese trade with Canada since 1955, prompted
the Japanese Economic Planning Agency to predict that Canada
will sell one billion dollars worth of goods annually to Japan
by 1970^^^ making Japan Canada's second largest trading partner.
There are other reasons for Canadian investors and
exporters looking elsewhere than the republics of Latin
America for market potential.

For example, the prospect of a

North Atlantic Free Trade Area is still viable as long as the

100

Macdonald, op.cit. p. 21.
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G.A.T.T. talks continue.

Secondly, Canada is looking for

a market that has reached a level of development that will
guarantee the highest rate of importation.

Japan with a

rapidly expanding consumer base and a high level of consumption
is readily available; Latin America is not.
It is evident that Latin America will not occupy a
special place in the economic, cultural or political plans
of the Canadian government.

The factors discussed above are

only a few of the basic tenets which indicate a cultural
and political wooing of Francophone Africa and a"commercial
awakening to the immediate appeal of the Japanese market.
It is a surity that Canadian-Latin American relations will
continue to expand as a natural outgrowth of rising Canadian
economic capability and Latin American internal development.
However, there is no priority urging greater Canadian involve
ment in the Latin Republics.

As John Holmes, former Under

secretary of State of External Affairs has pointed out:
Canada has nothing to gain from Latin
America that is not available elsewhere.1^1

101 John W. Holmes in an interview with the author,
November 28, 1968 in Windsor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
Arevalo, J.J.
The Shark and the Sardines. New York:
Lyle Stuart, 1961.
Berle, Adolph E. Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality.
New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
Black, Joseph and Thompson, Kenneth eds. Foreign Policies
In a World of Change. New York: Harper and Row,
1963.
Burr, Robert N. Our Troubled Hemisphere. Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1967.
Clark, Gerald.
D.

Canada, The Uneasy Neighbour.
McKay Ltd., 1965.

New York:

Clarkson, Stephen, ed. An Independent Foreign Policy for
Canada? Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1968.
Connell-Smith, Gordon.
The Inter-American System. London:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1966.
Craig, Gerald M.
The United States and Canada. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 196 8.
Dafoe, John W. Canada, An American Nation. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1935.
Dreir, John C. The Organization of the American States and
the Hemisphere Crisis. New York: Harper and Row
1962.
___________ ed.
The Alliance for Progress. Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1962.
Eayrs, James.
Northern Approaches. Toronto: McMillan and
C o ., 1961.
Harbron, John.
Canada and the Organization of the American
States. Washington: Canadian-Amencan Committee
1963.
Humphrey, John.
The Inter-American System: A Canadian View
Toronto: MacMillan Co., 1942.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

Keenleyside, Hugh et a l . The Growth of Canadian Policies in
Foreign Affair's. London: Duke University Commonweal
Studies, Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Manger, William.
Pan America in Crisis: The Future of the
O.A.S. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961.
Martin, Paul.
Paul Martin Speaks for Canada. Toronto:
McLelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1967.
May, Herbert K. Problems and Prospects of the Alliance for
Progress. New York: Praeger, 1968.
Mecham, J. Lloyd.
The United States and Inter-American Security
1889-1960. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961.
Reford, Robert.
Canada and Three Crisis. Toronto: Canadian
Institute of International Affairs, 1968.
Ronning, C. Neale.
Law and Politics in Inter-American Policy.
New York: Wiley, 1963.
___________

Punta del Este: The Limits of Collective Security
in a Troubled Hemisphere. New York: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1963.

Russell, P. ed.
Nationalism in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co.,
1966.
Schneider, Ronald M.
Communism in Guatemala 1944-1954. New York:
Praeger, 1958.
Slater, Jerome.
The O.A.S. and United States Foreign Policy.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967.
Slater, Jerome. A Revolution of Collective Security. Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1965.
Suarez, Andres.
Cuba: Castroism and Communism 1959-1966.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967.
Thomas, Ann and Thomas Jr., A.J.
The Organization of American
States. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press,
1963.
Whitaker, Arthur P. The Western Hemisphere Idea. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1954.
Wood, Bryce.

The Making of the Good Neighbour Policy. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

Articles

Anglin, Douglas C. United States Opposition to Canadian
Membership in the Pan American Union: A Canadian
View, "International Organization", Vol. XV.
Winter, 1961.
Brecker, Irving and Richard A.
Canada and Latin America:
"The Case for Canadian Involvement", Que e n 1s
Quarterly, Autumn, 1967, pp 462-471.
Burton, Bruce.
"Canada's Position in the World", The World and
the School, No. 14, October 1968, pp 19-27.
Clark, B.

"This League of Nations Actually Keeps the Peace",
Readers Digest, Vol. 72, June, 1958, pp 100-104.

Claude, Inis L.
"The O.A.S., the U.N . , the U.S.", International
Conciliation, No. 547, March, 1964.
Dreir, John C.
"The Council of the O.A.S.: Performance and
Potential", Journal of Inter-American Studies,
July, 1963.
____________

"The Organization of American States and United
States Policy", International Organization,
Winter, 1963.

Edinborough, Arnold, "O.A.S.: Should we Join?", Saturday N i g h t ,
Vol. 81, No. 11, March, 1966.
Fenwick, Charles, "The Inter-American Regional System - Fifty
Years of Progress", American Journal of
International L a w , January, 1956.
____________

Intervention: Individual and Collective, American
Journal of International L a w , No. 39, 1949.

Furniss, Edgar.
"The United States, The Inter-American System,
and the United Nations", Political Science
Quarterly, September, 1960.
Grant, Donald.
"Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy",
Journal of International Affairs, 1955, No. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

Holmes, J.W.

"Growing Independence in Canadian-American
Relations" Foreign Affairs, October, 1967, pp 151-166.

_____________ "Canada in Pan-America" An address delivered to
the American Historical Association, Toronto,
December, 1967.
_____________ "Canada and the United States in World Politics",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 10, October, 1961.
_____________ "The Unequal Alliance: Canada and the U.S.A."
Address to Fourth University of Windsor Seminar on
Canadian American Relations, University of Windsor
Press, 1962.
_____________ "Our Other Hemisphere: Reflections of the Bahia
Conference", International Journal, Autumn 1962,
pp 414-419.
_____________ "Canadian External Policies Since 1945” International
Journal, Spring 1963, pp 137-147.
_____________ "Canada in Search of Its Role" Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 41, July 1963, No. 7, pp 659-672.
_____________ "Diplomacy of a Middle Power", Atlantic Monthly,
November, 1964, pp 106-112.
_____________ "Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy" in Peter
Russell, ed., Nationalism in Canada, Toronto:
McGraw-Hill, 1966.
Irwin, Arthur, W.
"Should Canada Join the Organization of
American States?" Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 72,
Summer, 1965.
_____________ "Should Canada Join the O.A.S.?" Canadian
Forum, Vol. 46, June, 1966, pp 59-62.
Javits, Jacob, K.
"Last Chance for a Common Market",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, April, 1967, pp 449-462.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92

Lumsden, Ian, C.
"Latin America: The View from Canada",
Canadian Dimension, July, 1967.
Lyon, Peyton, W.
"Canada is Becoming a Mouse that Roars",
MacLean1s Magazine, June 18, 1960.
Macdonald, H. Ian.
"Canada in Two Hemispheres", Behind the
Headlines, C.I.I.A. Vol. 23, July, 1964, No. 6.
Miller, N.

"The Alliance Without Progress", New Republic,
Vol. 157, September 9, 1967, pp 8-9.

Moscoso, T.

"Should United States end Hemispheric Aid?"
U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 64, May 20, 1968,
pp 17-18.

O'Brien, D.

"Canada and the O.A.S.", Commonweal, Vol. 79,
October 11, 1963, pp 71-2.

Padelford, Norman J.
"Co-Operation in the Central American
Region, The Organization of Central American States",
International Organization, Winter, 1957.
Pike, Frederick.
"Guatemala, the U.S. and Communism in the
Americas", Review of Politics, April, 1955.
Reid, Escott.
"Canadian Foreign Policy 1967-1977: A Second
Golden Decade?"
International Journal, Spring, 1967
pp 171-181.
Schanders, Ian.
"The Case Against Canadian Membership in the
O.A.S." MacLeans, Vol. 26, No. 13, June 15, 1963.
Scheman, Ronald L.
"Admission of States to the O.A.S.",
American Journal of International L a w , Vol. 58,
October, 1964, pp 968-974.
Smith, D.E.

"Should Canada Join the Organization of American
States?" Queen's Quarterly, Spring, 1966, pp 100-114.

Soward, F.H.

"New Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy?"
International Studies, April, 1966, pp 515-536.
Documents

Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance 1948-56. Reports on uses of the Rio
Treaty, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C. 1957.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

Burr, Robert, N . , and Hussey, Roland eds.
Documents on
Inter-American Cooperation, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1955.
Canada, House of Commons Debates, Queen's Printer, Ottawa
1930-1968.
Canadian International Development Agency. Information Division,
Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1967-8.
Chronological Collection of Documents, Pan American Union,
Washington, D.C., 1954.
Department of External Affairs, Monthly Report, Canadian
Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1960-9.
Department of External Affairs, Numbered Letter, XL
Ottawa, December 22, 1964.

(M) - 363,

Department of State Bulletin, Washington, D.C., 1945-1968.
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Information Office, Queen's
Printer, Ottawa, 1945-1968.
Introduction to the Latin American Nations, No. 910-E-5456,
Department of Information and Public Affairs,
Pan American Union, Revised edition, Washington, D.C.,
1968.
Ogelsky, J.C.M. Report Prepared for the Department of External
Affairs, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1967.
Report of the Canadian Ministerial Mission to Latin America,
Queen's Printer, Ottawa, October 27, 1968.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Congress,
Washington, D.C., 1960____ .
Senate Foreign Relations Study, No. 3, "The O.A.S.", North
western University, Washington, D.C., 1959.
Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes, House of
Commons, Ottawa, 1949-68.
Statements and Speeches, Department of External Affairs,
Information Division, Queen's Printer, Ottawa,
1964-1968.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94

Press Sources
Cite Libre
Communique, Department of External Affairs, Information
Division, Ottawa, 1964-7.
Financial Post
Globe and Mail
La Presse
Le Devoir
Le Droit
Montreal Star
New York Times
Ottawa Citizen
Toronto Daily Star
Vancouver Sun
Windsor Star
Winnipeg Free Press
Interviews
The following persons were kind enough to discuss aspects
of the thesis with the author:
Dr. John W. Holmes, Director-General of the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs.
Hon. Paul Martin, Government Leader in the Senate.
Hon. Otto Lang, Acting Minister of Mines and Northern Resources.
Professor Bruce E. Burton.
Professor Ian Lumsden.
Professor Lloyd Brown-John.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VITA AUCTORIS
Family;

Jack Orval Kiervin, son of A.P. Kiervin
and F.C. McKay; born October 1, 1945,
Windsor, Ontario.
Brothers;
Norman and William.

Married;

May 25, 1968 to Shirley Ellen Shivas

Education;

Elementary education at Holy Rosary
Separate School, Milton, Ontario.
Secondary education at Milton District
High School.
Senior Matriculation, 1964.
Registered at University of Windsor in
Faculty of Arts and Science. Bachelor of
Arts, 1967.
Candidate for Master of Arts degree.
Thesis submitted April, 1,969.

95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

